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Abstract:	  This	  paper	  looks	  at	  the	  implications	  for	  governance	  in	  interpersonal	  economic	  inequality	  in	  Europe.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  looks	  at	  the	  economic	  repercussions	  of	  territorial	  governance	  and	  intergovernmental	  relations	  stemming	  from	  this	  governance	  structure	  from	  different	  perspectives:	  Regional,	  national	  and	  EU-­‐level.	  First,	  by	  using	  cross-­‐sectional	  data,	  it	  tests	  whether	  countries	  with	  higher	  regional	  fiscal	  authority	  and	  more	  decentralized	  governance	  structures	  experience	  higher	  interpersonal	  income	  inequality.	  Then,	  it	  examines	  whether	  the	  co-­‐sharing	  of	  fiscal	  power	  between	  the	  center	  and	  the	  subnational	  actors	  is	  related	  to	  lower	  inequality	  levels.	  Using	  qualitative	  data	  gathered	  in	  fieldwork,	  the	  second	  section	  takes	  Germany	  as	  a	  case	  for	  understanding	  the	  importance	  of	  governance	  on	  redistributive	  matters	  and	  inequality.	  The	  case	  study	  shows	  that,	  despite	  increases	  in	  inequality,	  a	  general	  federal	  commitment	  to	  achieving	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  economic	  and	  services	  inequality	  persists	  in	  Germany	  through	  the	  delicate	  balance	  of	  centralized	  and	  decentralized	  elements	  of	  its	  federal	  governance	  structure.	  	  *I	  sincerely	  thank	  the	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  of	  Pittsburgh	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  Union	  Center	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  Union	  for	  their	  generous	  support	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  and	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  at	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  and	  for	  allowing	  me	  to	  be	  a	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  of	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Federalism,	  Governance	  and	  Economic	  Inequality:	  A	  Comparative	  Study	  in	  
Europe	  and	  the	  Case	  of	  Germany	  	  Increasing	  economic	  inequality	  is	  a	  worldwide	  phenomenon.	  Recent	  years	  have	  seen	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  rich	  and	  poor	  increase	  not	  only	  in	  countries	  with	  already	  high	  inequality	  levels	  but	  also	  in	  many	  European	  countries	  known	  to	  be	  more	  egalitarian.	  Widening	  income	  gaps	  between	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  poor	  have	  become	  a	  global	  phenomenon	  in	  the	  recent	  decades	  especially	  in	  the	  developed	  economies.	  A	  report	  published	  in	  December	  2011	  by	  the	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  (OECD)	  informs	  us	  that	  in	  2000s,	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  rich	  and	  poor	  increased	  not	  only	  in	  countries	  with	  already	  high	  inequality	  levels	  but	  also	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  Germany,	  Denmark,	  and	  Sweden,	  known	  to	  be	  ‘more	  egalitarian’.	  The	  income	  gap	  in	  those	  countries	  has	  risen	  from	  5	  to	  1	  in	  the	  1980s	  to	  6	  to	  1	  today.	  In	  Italy,	  Japan,	  Korea	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  this	  gap	  is	  10	  to	  1.	  Since	  1990,	  the	  wage	  gap	  between	  the	  10%	  highest	  and	  lowest	  paid	  of	  full-­‐time	  German	  workers	  has	  increased	  more	  than	  five	  times.	  1	  	  	   The	  economic	  inequality	  research	  had	  been	  neglected	  in	  the	  period	  following	  the	  end	  of	  the	  World	  War	  II	  during	  the	  times	  of	  economic	  growth	  in	  North	  America	  and	  Western	  Europe,	  but	  interest	  in	  understanding	  the	  determinants	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  inequality	  has	  resurfaced	  since	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  This	  upsurge	  in	  interest	  is	  usually	  credited	  to	  the	  increasing	  economic	  inequality	  levels	  especially	  in	  the	  industrialized	  countries	  (Jenkins	  and	  Micklewright	  2007,	  Kenworthy	  2004,	  Kenworthy	  and	  Pontusson	  2005,	  Stiglitz	  2012).	  As	  the	  wage	  distribution	  widened	  in	  1980s	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  in	  the	  USA,	  researchers	  on	  income	  inequality	  started	  to	  be	  concerned	  with	  whether	  income	  inequality	  was	  a	  peril	  of	  these	  two	  countries,	  or	  whether	  it	  was	  prevalent	  in	  the	  industrialized	  world	  (Salverda,	  Nolan	  and	  Smeeding	  2009;	  Gottschald	  and	  Smeeding	  1997).	  Taking	  into	  account	  the	  recent	  upsurge	  in	  inequality	  among	  developed	  economies	  in	  the	  world,	  Europe	  is	  an	  appropriate	  region	  to	  investigate	  the	  determinants	  of	  inequality.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Great	  Recession	  of	  the	  late	  2000s	  also	  heightened	  concerns	  about	  inequality,	  resulted	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  OECD	  (2011),	  Divided	  We	  Stand:	  Why	  Inequality	  Keeps	  Rising,	  www.oecd.org/els/social/inequality	  Country	  Note:	  Germany.	  I	  will	  revisit	  this	  trend	  later	  in	  the	  section	  about	  Germany.	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many	  protest	  movements	  around	  the	  worlds,	  including	  the	  Occupy	  Wall	  Street	  
Movement,	  and	  brought	  inequality	  to	  the	  research	  agendas	  of	  many	  academics	  and	  practitioners	  (Alderson	  and	  Doran	  2013).	  	  Over	  the	  last	  few	  decades,	  several	  scholars	  have	  investigated	  the	  determinants	  of	  income	  inequality	  from	  a	  structural	  perspective,	  looking	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  political	  institutions	  and	  economic	  indicators,	  such	  as	  poverty,	  growth,	  inflation,	  unemployment	  and	  investment	  (Boix	  2003,	  2010,	  Qian	  and	  Weingast	  1997,	  Reuveny	  and	  Li	  2003).	  These	  studies	  are	  informative	  about	  the	  institutional	  and	  contextual	  factors	  that	  influence	  income	  inequality	  in	  specific	  countries.	  For	  example,	  changing	  patterns	  of	  trade,	  declining	  rates	  of	  unionization	  and	  the	  decentralization	  of	  wage-­‐setting	  have	  been	  shown	  as	  some	  contributors	  to	  increasing	  inequality,	  but	  no	  single	  ‘smoking	  gun’	  has	  been	  agreed	  upon	  (Alderson	  and	  Nielsen	  2002,	  Gustafsson	  and	  Johansson	  1999).	  2	  	  Addressing	  the	  determinants	  of	  income	  inequality	  in	  developed	  economies	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  territorial	  governance/decentralization	  offers	  a	  suitable	  framework	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  redistributive	  welfare	  state	  policies	  are	  influenced	  by	  the	  territorial	  structure	  of	  countries.	  	  We	  know	  that	  some	  political	  structures	  are	  more	  ‘inequality	  inducing’	  than	  ‘inequality	  reducing’	  (Linz	  and	  Stepan	  2000)	  due	  to	  the	  organization	  and	  the	  aims	  of	  their	  tax	  structures,	  yet	  there	  is	  no	  consensus	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  induction	  or	  reduction.	  Several	  authors	  claim	  that	  the	  varying	  levels	  of	  decision-­‐making	  autonomy	  of	  subnational	  units	  have	  important	  repercussions	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  income	  in	  a	  country	  (Marks	  et	  al.	  2008,	  2010;	  Boix	  2003;	  Beramendi	  2007).	  However,	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  and	  the	  directions	  of	  the	  mechanism	  have	  been	  underexplored,	  especially	  as	  far	  as	  empirical	  studies	  are	  concerned.	  There	  is	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  concerning	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  that	  links	  these	  three	  components:	  Economic	  geography	  (namely	  territorial	  governance	  patterns),	  redistribution	  and	  income	  inequality.	  If	  redistribution,	  by	  default,	  targets	  economic	  distribution,	  and	  thus	  inequality;	  then	  how	  do	  territorial	  governance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Obviously,	  determinants	  of	  rising	  inequality	  have	  also	  been	  studied	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  wage	  inequality,	  brought	  about	  by	  globalization	  and	  technological	  changes	  (Alderson	  and	  Doran	  2013).	  However,	  in	  this	  paper	  I	  look	  at	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  existing	  governance	  structure	  of	  countries,	  holding	  other	  important	  variables	  constant.	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patterns,	  which	  shape	  redistributive	  politics,	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  inequality?	  This	  is	  the	  main	  question	  I	  address	  in	  this	  paper,	  with	  my	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  study.	   This	  paper	  looks	  at	  the	  implications	  for	  territorial	  governance	  for	  regional	  and	  interpersonal	  economic	  inequality	  across	  Europe	  with	  a	  quantitative	  study,	  and	  with	  a	  case	  study	  on	  Germany.	  The	  first	  section	  of	  the	  paper	  presents	  a	  statistical	  analysis	  on	  European	  countries.	  By	  using	  cross-­‐sectional	  data,	  it	  first	  tests	  whether	  countries	  with	  higher	  regional	  fiscal	  authority	  and	  more	  decentralized	  governance	  structures	  experience	  higher	  interpersonal	  economic	  inequality.	  Then,	  it	  examines	  whether	  the	  co-­‐sharing	  of	  fiscal	  power	  between	  the	  center	  and	  the	  subnational	  levels,	  and	  the	  relevant	  non-­‐state	  actors	  is	  related	  to	  lower	  interpersonal	  inequality	  levels.	  The	  results	  are	  in	  line	  with	  the	  theoretical	  expectation	  that,	  across	  Europe,	  higher	  fiscal	  decentralization	  leads	  to	  higher	  income	  inequality,	  but	  the	  co-­‐sharing	  of	  fiscal	  power	  is	  associated	  with	  lower	  income	  inequality.	  	   	   The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  paper	  takes	  Germany	  as	  a	  case,	  and	  uses	  qualitative	  data	  gathered	  from	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  in	  the	  field	  to	  further	  examine	  how	  the	  territorial	  governance	  structure	  impacts	  redistributive	  matters	  in	  the	  country.	  This	  case	  study	  shows	  that,	  a)	  despite	  increases	  in	  income	  inequality	  in	  the	  last	  decades,	  the	  general	  commitment	  to	  achieving	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  economic	  and	  services	  equality	  persists	  in	  Germany	  through	  its	  delicate	  balance	  of	  centralized	  and	  decentralized	  elements,	  and	  b)	  the	  territorial	  governance	  structure	  has	  a	  bigger	  influence	  on	  regional	  inequality	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  services	  rather	  than	  national	  interpersonal	  inequality.	  	  The	  case	  study	  of	  Germany	  also	  looks	  at	  the	  role	  of	  the	  region	  (Land)	  of	  North	  Rhine-­‐Westphalia	  as	  an	  example	  of	  how	  intergovernmental	  relations	  and	  the	  interactiveness	  of	  governance	  in	  Germany	  has	  a	  bearing	  on	  implementing	  the	  European	  level	  policies	  that	  target	  economic	  inequality.	  	  	  
1)	  Territorial	  Governance	  and	  Inequality:	  Theoretical	  Perspective	  and	  
Quantitative	  Study	  The	  lack	  of	  scholarly	  consensus	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  territorial	  governance	  structure	  on	  income	  inequality	  levels	  enables	  us	  to	  analyze	  this	  link	  through	  different	  lenses.	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Governing	  always	  has	  a	  territorial	  dimension	  to	  it	  (Hague	  and	  Harrop	  2004),	  since	  rulers	  need	  to	  extract	  resources	  from	  regions	  while	  keeping	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  population	  to	  stay	  in	  their	  own	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  The	  differences	  in	  the	  organization	  of	  this	  territorial	  dimension	  are	  mainly	  analyzed	  within	  the	  dichotomy	  of	  federal	  and	  unitary	  states.	  Yet,	  not	  all	  types	  of	  federal	  and	  unitary	  states	  produce	  same	  type	  of	  policy	  outcomes.	  There	  are	  two	  competing	  views	  on	  whether	  federalism	  (measured	  with	  higher	  regional	  authority	  in	  this	  paper)	  can	  address	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  economic	  discrepancies.	  	  First,	  some	  welfare	  economists,	  such	  as	  Gramlich	  (1973)	  and	  Oates	  (1972)	  argue	  that	  federalism	  can	  deal	  with	  different	  local	  preferences	  and	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  externalities	  in	  a	  more	  effective	  way.	  Another	  similar	  view	  of	  federalism	  comes	  from	  public	  choice	  theorists	  as	  it	  enables	  different	  levels	  of	  government	  to	  extract	  returns	  in	  a	  strategic	  way	  (Qian	  and	  Weingast	  1997).	  However,	  the	  competing	  view,	  which	  this	  paper	  is	  based	  on,	  emphasizes	  how	  federalism	  enables	  extra	  veto	  points	  that	  can	  block	  ‘nationwide	  distributive	  endeavors’	  and	  ‘large	  redistributive	  coalitions’	  (Beramendi	  2012).	  	  The	  understanding	  that	  federalism	  or	  more	  decentralized	  political	  structures	  are	  associated	  with	  lower	  redistribution	  and	  thus	  less	  equality	  has	  been	  dominant	  in	  the	  political	  economy	  literature,	  albeit	  without	  much	  empirical	  application	  (Wildavsky	  1984,	  Rodden	  2006,	  Treisman	  2004,	  2007).	  	  Wildavsky	  has	  argued	  that	  ‘there	  is	  no	  
escape	  from	  a	  compelling	  truth:	  federalism	  and	  equality	  of	  results	  cannot	  coexist”	  (1984,	  p.68).	  Fiscal	  federalism	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  concepts	  that	  link	  the	  territorial	  governance	  structure	  with	  inequality.	  In	  his	  seminal	  work	  on	  fiscal	  federalism,	  Oates	  (1972)	  regards	  the	  tackling	  of	  inequality	  as	  an	  important	  task	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  in	  a	  country	  where	  ‘optimum	  welfare	  state’	  is	  sought	  after.	  ‘The	  attainment	  of	  the	  most	  equitable	  distribution	  of	  income	  (the	  distribution	  problem)’	  has	  been	  regarded	  as	  an	  important	  task	  for	  the	  governments,	  yet	  as	  Oates	  (1972)	  argues,	  highly	  decentralized	  fiscal	  systems	  can	  have	  different	  communities	  whose	  levels	  of	  willingness	  to	  carry	  out	  ‘equalitarian	  distributions	  of	  income’	  can	  vary	  to	  a	  great	  extent.	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Based	  on	  this	  discussion,	  in	  what	  ways	  can	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  government,	  or	  the	  allocation	  of	  authority	  across	  jurisdictions,	  can	  influence	  redistribution	  in	  a	  country?	  What	  is	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  level	  of	  relationship	  between	  the	  central	  authority	  and	  the	  subnational	  political	  units	  on	  income	  inequality?	  Does	  having	  more	  authoritative	  regions	  lead	  to	  more	  income	  inequality	  in	  a	  country?	  Based	  on	  the	  literature	  review	  on	  territorial	  governance	  and	  inequality,	  my	  theory	  is	  as	  follows:	  I	  expect	  higher	  regional	  authority	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  increasing	  inequality,	  mainly	  through	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  of	  limiting	  redistribution.	  Thus,	  the	  more	  decentralized	  a	  country	  is,	  the	  higher	  the	  expected	  inequality.	  This	  causal	  mechanism	  rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  welfare	  would	  be	  undermined	  when	  the	  center	  has	  less	  power,	  and	  that	  there	  will	  be	  under-­‐provision	  of	  social	  welfare,	  or	  a	  ‘race	  to	  the	  bottom’	  (Pierson	  1995).	  Higher	  levels	  of	  revenue	  sharing	  granted	  to	  regions	  through	  fiscal	  autonomy	  should	  also	  have	  an	  increasing	  impact	  on	  inequality	  due	  to	  the	  lessening	  of	  the	  standardization	  of	  redistribution.	  If	  the	  subnational	  units	  and	  the	  central	  government	  interact	  and	  decide	  together	  on	  fiscal	  issues,	  then	  this	  is	  expected	  to	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  income	  inequality.	  My	  main	  argument	  is	  that	  devolution	  to	  regions,	  and	  especially	  fiscal	  devolution	  where	  regions	  can	  implement	  their	  own	  tax	  policies,	  inhibits	  the	  overall	  ability	  of	  the	  central	  government	  to	  exercise	  standardized	  central	  fiscal	  policies	  (redistributive	  and	  tax)	  that	  target	  inequality.	  Additionally,	  in	  a	  devolved	  structure,	  intraregional	  differences	  in	  capacities	  of	  the	  regions	  can	  also	  lead	  to	  inconsistencies	  in	  redistribution	  and	  infrastructures	  to	  overcome	  income	  disparities.	  However,	  if	  subnational	  units	  (e.g.	  regions)	  share	  the	  power	  in	  deciding	  what	  the	  central	  government	  ‘redistributes’	  and	  there	  are	  more	  structural	  opportunities	  for	  ‘consensus’,	  this	  would	  offset	  the	  impact	  of	  regional	  fiscal	  autonomy	  on	  increasing	  income	  inequality.	  	  In	  the	  quantitative	  study,	  I	  test	  the	  following	  two	  hypotheses:	  
Hypothesis 1: OECD countries in Western Europe that have more overall regional 
authority (more devolution to regions) are more likely to have higher income 
inequality. 
Hypothesis 2:  Fiscal authority is a significant predictor of income inequality in 
OECD countries in Western Europe. 
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2a: The higher the fiscal autonomy of subnational units, the higher the national 
income inequality. (self-rule) 
2b: The higher the fiscal shared rule level of subnational units with the central 
government, the lower the national income inequality. (shared-rule) 	  
Data	  and	  Research	  Design	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  understanding	  the	  hypothesized	  effect	  of	  varying	  degrees	  of	  regional	  authority	  on	  income	  inequality,	  a	  fixed	  effects	  model	  is	  applied,	  to	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  results	  are	  dependent	  on	  any	  particular	  effect	  pertaining	  to	  a	  country	  in	  the	  sample.	  The	  data	  set	  includes	  17	  OECD	  countries	  in	  Europe3	  with	  information	  on	  subnational	  government	  levels	  with	  an	  average	  population	  of	  150,000	  or	  more	  citizens.	  The	  unit	  of	  analysis	  is	  country-­‐year,	  and	  it	  includes	  data	  for	  the	  time	  period	  of	  1960	  to	  2006.	  Including	  the	  OECD	  countries	  in	  the	  analysis	  is	  justified	  since	  I	  would	  like	  to	  compare	  industrialized	  ‘comparable	  countries’	  in	  Western	  Europe	  for	  income	  distribution,	  in	  order	  to	  single	  out	  the	  effects	  of	  regional	  authority.	  	  
	  
Dependent	  Variable	  The	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  national	  NET	  INCOME	  INTERPERSONAL	  INEQUALITY	  level,	  which	  is	  operationalized	  by	  the	  Gini	  coefficient.4	  The	  unit	  of	  analysis	  for	  this	  study	  is	  country	  year	  for	  the	  years	  1960	  –	  2006.	  	  Also,	  Gini	  scores	  are	  calculated	  with	  different	  determinants	  for	  some	  countries5.	  	  I	  use	  the	  post-­‐tax	  net	  income	  inequality	  measure,	  which	  is	  the	  measure	  after	  taxes	  and	  transfers,	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  full	  list	  of	  countries	  included	  in	  the	  dataset	  is	  in	  the	  Appendix.	  Iceland	  is	  dropped	  because	  of	  missing	  data.	  4The Gini coefficient is based on the Lorenz curve that plots the share of population against the received 
income (Deininger and Squire 1996).It	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  measurement	  of	  inequality	  is	  a	  complex	  matter.	  Inequality	  data	  taken	  from	  Frederick	  Solt’s	  Standardized	  World	  Income	  Inequality	  Database	  (SWIID),	  which	  standardizes	  the	  United	  Nations	  University’s	  World	  Income	  Inequality	  Database.	  It	  uses	  the	  data	  collected	  by	  the	  Luxembourg	  Income	  Study	  as	  the	  standard.	  The	  SWIID	  has	  comparable	  Gini	  indices	  of	  gross	  and	  net	  income	  inequality	  for	  171	  countries	  from	  1960	  to	  the	  present,	  and	  estimates	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  these	  statistics.	  http://www.siuc.edu/~fsolt/swiid/swiid.html 5	  The	  Gini	  coefficient	  can	  range	  from	  0	  to	  1;	  it	  is	  sometimes	  multiplied	  by	  100	  to	  range	  between	  0	  and	  100.	  A	  Gini	  coefficient	  of	  100	  denotes	  perfect	  income	  inequality,	  whereas	  a	  Gini	  of	  zero	  indicates	  perfect	  income	  equality	  in	  a	  country.	  In	  this	  data	  set,	  the	  Gini	  coefficient	  measure	  is	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  to	  100.	  The	  larger	  the	  Gini	  coefficient,	  the	  more	  income	  inequality	  there	  is	  in	  that	  country.	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order	  to	  control	  for	  income	  inequality	  after	  redistribution	  and	  social	  spending,	  as	  my	  argument	  is	  centered	  on	  how	  decentralization	  impacts	  the	  redistributive	  role	  of	  the	  countries.	  
	  
Independent	  Variables	  The	  main	  independent	  variable	  of	  this	  study,	  which	  measures	  decentralization,	  is	  taken	  from	  Hooghe,	  Marks	  and	  Schakel’s	  “Regional	  Authority	  
Index”	  (2008,	  2010)6.	  	  The	  aggregate	  regional	  authority	  index	  score	  consists	  of	  the	  addition	  of	  the	  following	  characteristics:	  The	  self-­‐rule	  and	  the	  shared	  rule	  aspects	  of	  the	  relevant	  regions	  in	  one	  country,	  which	  in	  total	  are	  measured	  along	  eight	  dimensions.	  The	  variables	  making	  up	  the	  shared	  rule	  score	  measure	  the	  authority	  exercised	  by	  the	  regional	  government	  in	  co-­‐determining	  decision	  making	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  The	  four	  components	  are:	  Law	  making,	  executive	  control,	  fiscal	  
control,	  and	  constitutional	  reform.	  A	  regional	  government	  can	  exercise	  authority	  either	  in	  its	  own	  jurisdiction	  –	  self	  rule-­‐;	  or	  it	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  decision	  making	  in	  the	  country	  by	  sharing	  the	  power	  with	  the	  central	  government	  and	  other	  regional	  governments–	  shared	  rule-­‐,	  a	  well-­‐known	  conceptualization	  coined	  by	  Elazar	  (1987)	  These	  Table	  1	  explains	  these	  measures.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Hooghe,	  Liesbet,	  Gary	  Marks,	  Arjan	  H.	  Schakel	  (2008),	  "Regional	  Authority	  in	  42	  Democracies,	  1950–2006:	  A	  Measure	  and	  Five	  Hypotheses,"	  Regional	  and	  Federal	  Studies,	  18,	  2-­‐3:	  111-­‐302.	  Hooghe,	  Liesbet,	  Gary	  Marks,	  Arjan	  H.	  Schakel	  (2010).	  “The	  Rise	  of	  Regional	  Authority:	  A	  Comparative	  Study	  of	  42	  Democracies’,	  New	  York:	  Routledge.	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  Table	  1:	  Components	  of	  the	  Regional	  Authority	  Index	  	  1. Institutional	  depth:	  The	  authority	  exercised	  by	  a	  regional	  government	  is	  autonomous	  rather	  than	  de-­‐concentrated.	  (Measured	  from	  0	  to	  3)	  2. Policy	  scope:	  The	  range	  of	  policies	  for	  which	  a	  regional	  government	  is	  responsible	  (Measured	  from	  0	  to	  4)	  3. Fiscal	  autonomy:	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  regional	  government	  can	  independently	  tax	  its	  population.	  (Measured	  from	  0	  to	  5)	  4. Representation:	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  regional	  government	  is	  endowed	  with	  an	  independent	  legislature	  and	  executive.	  (Measured	  from	  0	  to	  4)	  5. Law	  making:	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  regional	  representatives	  co-­‐determine	  national	  legislation.	  (Measured	  from	  0	  to	  2)	  6. Executive	  control:	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  regional	  government	  co-­‐determines	  national	  policy	  in	  intergovernmental	  meetings.	  (Measured	  from	  0	  to	  2)	  7. Fiscal	  control:	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  regional	  representatives	  co-­‐determine	  the	  distribution	  of	  national	  tax	  revenues.	  (Measured	  from	  0	  to	  3)	  8. Constitutional	  reform:	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  regional	  representatives	  co-­‐determine	  constitutional	  change.	  (Measured	  from	  0	  to	  3)	  Source:	  Hooghe	  et.	  al	  (2010)	  	  The	  overall	  Regional	  Authority	  Index	  (RAI)	  score	  of	  a	  country	  is	  calculated	  by	  adding	  all	  of	  the	  abovementioned	  relevant	  scores	  together.	  However,	  the	  scores	  are	  also	  weighted	  according	  to	  certain	  conditions	  in	  the	  countries.	  The	  more	  regional	  tiers	  a	  country	  has,	  the	  higher	  is	  the	  country	  score,	  all	  other	  things	  equal.	  This	  index	  presents	  useful	  measures	  of	  different	  types	  of	  decentralization	  that	  actually	  measures	  the	  territorial	  institutional	  arrangements	  making	  it	  appropriate	  it	  to	  use	  in	  this	  study.	  7I	  first	  use	  the	  aggregate	  measure	  of	  the	  regional	  authority	  index,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  According	  to	  Hooghe	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  among	  the	  abovementioned	  eight	  dimensions,	  the	  Cronbach’s	  
alpha	  in	  2006	  is	  0.94,	  indicating	  that	  the	  dimensions	  actually	  do	  cover	  a	  single	  construct	  to	  a	  great	  extent.	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rather	  than	  using	  different	  disaggregate	  measures	  of	  the	  construct.	  Then	  I	  use	  fiscal	  
autonomy	  and	  fiscal	  control	  and	  remove	  RAI	  in	  the	  following	  models,	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  multicollinearity.	  Analyzing	  the	  index	  data,	  one	  can	  see	  that	  no	  country	  in	  the	  sample	  has	  experienced	  a	  transition	  from	  a	  more	  regionalized	  structure	  to	  a	  less	  regionalized	  structure	  during	  the	  period	  covered.	  However,	  certain	  countries	  have	  transitioned	  from	  a	  less	  regionalized	  to	  a	  more	  regionalized	  structure	  over	  time,	  such	  as	  Belgium,	  France,	  Italy	  and	  Spain.	  	  As	  explained	  in	  the	  theory	  section,	  I	  also	  single	  out	  certain	  components	  of	  the	  aggregate	  RAI	  index	  to	  test	  my	  second	  hypothesis.	  Rather	  than	  the	  aggregate	  RAI	  score,	  I	  use	  FISCAL	  AUTONOMY	  and	  FISCAL	  CONTROL	  indices	  in	  Model	  2	  and	  3,	  to	  test	  Hypothesis	  2a	  and	  Hypothesis	  2b.	  Whereas	  FISCAL	  AUTONOMY	  corresponds	  with	  self-­‐rule	  of	  fiscal	  authority	  of	  subnational	  units,	  FISCAL	  CONTROL	  indicates	  the	  shared-­‐rule	  component	  of	  federalism,	  where	  the	  subnational	  units	  and	  the	  central	  government	  co-­‐decide	  on	  redistributive	  matters.	  I	  use	  them	  separately	  to	  see	  whether	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  of	  regional	  authority	  and	  inequality	  goes	  through	  the	  channel	  of	  centralized/decentralized	  fiscal	  structure,	  which	  measures	  tax	  autonomy	  and	  co-­‐decision	  on	  tax	  revenues,	  respectively.	  In	  Model	  4,	  I	  include	  both	  FISCAL	  AUTONOMY	  and	  FISCAL	  CONTROL	  together	  since	  they	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive	  indices.	  Model	  4	  aims	  to	  control	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  these	  variables	  on	  one	  another	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  income	  inequality.	  Additionally,	  I	  use	  some	  control	  variables	  to	  see	  whether	  the	  causal	  effect	  between	  regional	  authority	  and	  income	  inequality	  is	  affected	  by	  certain	  variables	  that	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  causes	  of	  inequality	  in	  the	  literature.	  To	  account	  for	  some	  economic	  factors	  that	  might	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  national	  inequality	  levels,	  I	  use	  the	  control	  variables	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  the	  overall	  unemployment	  level	  (UNEMPLOYMENT)	  and	  annual	  economic	  growth	  (GDP	  GROWTH),	  democracy,	  social	  expenditures,	  social	  security	  transfers,	  wage	  coordination	  and	  net	  union	  membership.8	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Due	  to	  space	  reasons,	  I	  explain	  the	  control	  variables	  in	  the	  appendix.	  Data	  taken	  from	  Penn	  World	  Tables.	  Alan	  Heston,	  Robert	  Summers	  and	  Bettina	  Aten,	  Penn	  World	  Table	  Version	  7.0,	  Center	  for	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Results	  of	  the	  Quantitative	  Study	  I	  test	  my	  model,	  taking	  the	  (interpersonal	  net	  national	  income	  inequality	  as	  my	  dependent	  variable.	  The	  fixed	  effects	  model	  produce	  mixed	  results	  on	  regional	  authority	  and	  income	  inequality.	  Table	  2	  shows	  the	  results,	  where	  the	  impact	  of	  aggregated	  regional	  authority	  scores	  of	  countries,	  regional	  fiscal	  autonomy	  and	  regional	  fiscal	  control,	  are	  tested	  separately	  on	  net	  national	  income	  inequality	  levels	  after	  transfers	  in	  European	  countries.	  	   As	  the	  results	  of	  Model	  1	  show,	  ranking	  higher	  on	  overall	  REGIONAL	  AUTHORITY	  scores	  is	  not	  a	  significant	  predictor	  of	  overall	  income	  inequality.	  This	  result	  accentuates	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  fiscal	  powers	  of	  regions	  in	  decentralization,	  rather	  than	  using	  an	  aggregated	  score	  that	  measures	  the	  overall	  political	  decentralization.	  Thus,	  the	  first	  hypothesis	  does	  not	  hold.	  The	  results	  also	  indicate	  democracy	  is	  significantly	  and	  positively	  related	  to	  income	  inequality,	  as	  well	  as	  unemployment	  and	  employment	  in	  industry,	  as	  suggested	  by	  previous	  research.	  Net	  union	  membership	  is	  also	  negatively	  related	  to	  income	  inequality,	  as	  expected.	  However	  social	  security	  transfers	  fails	  to	  reach	  statistical	  significance,	  showing	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  social	  security	  transfers	  does	  not	  account	  for	  net	  income	  inequality.	  	  Model	  2	  takes	  FISCAL	  AUTONOMY	  as	  its	  measure	  of	  decentralization,	  rather	  than	  the	  combined	  RAI	  score.	  As	  predicted	  in	  Hypothesis	  2a,	  countries	  with	  regions	  of	  higher	  fiscal	  autonomy	  have	  more	  national	  net	  income	  inequality;	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  %99	  confidence	  level.	  Therefore,	  the	  countries	  where	  the	  regional	  government	  sets	  the	  rate	  of	  more	  of	  the	  major	  taxes	  (personal	  income,	  corporate,	  value	  added	  or	  sales	  tax)	  are	  expected	  to	  have	  a	  more	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  income.	  This	  autonomy	  gives	  room	  to	  regional	  governments	  to	  decide	  on	  their	  own	  taxes,	  and	  if	  all	  the	  regions	  have	  varying	  tax	  structures,	  this	  will	  lead	  to	  discrepancies	  between	  regions	  in	  redistribution,	  leading	  to	  more	  overall	  income	  inequality.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  International	  Comparisons	  of	  Production,	  Income	  and	  Prices	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania,	  May	  2011.	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Table 2: Determinants of Net Income Inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










      
Regional authority index 0.0681     
 (0.0497)     
     
Fiscal autonomy  0.556***  0.372** 0.396*** 
  (0.141)  (0.147) (0.152) 
Fiscal control   -2.880*** -2.381*** -2.993*** 
   (0.583) (0.612) (0.644) 
Democracy -0.303 -0.128 0.0507 0.0178 -0.0999 
 (0.368) (0.338) (0.336) (0.335) (0.626) 
GDP per capita 7.13e-05*** 6.68e-05*** 6.58e-05*** 6.11e-05*** 7.05e-05*** 
 (1.50e-05) (1.45e-05) (1.43e-05) (1.43e-05) (2.41e-05) 
GDP growth -0.0713 -0.0550 -0.0557 -0.0537 -0.0386 
 (0.0440) (0.0423) (0.0419) (0.0416) (0.0452) 
Unemployment 0.0682* 0.0821** 0.0871** 0.0937** 0.148*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0381) (0.0377) (0.0375) (0.0453) 
Employment industry 0.00165*** 0.00151*** 0.00185*** 0.00174*** 0.00206*** 
 (0.000319) (0.000314) (0.000313) (0.000314) (0.000296) 
Social expenditures -0.0458 -0.0501 -0.0304 -0.0374 -0.374*** 
 (0.0507) (0.0499) (0.0494) (0.0492) (0.0658) 
Net union membership -0.00184*** -0.00173*** -0.00202*** -0.00194*** -0.00240*** 
 (0.000284) (0.000279) (0.000279) (0.000279) (0.000261) 
Social security transfers 0.0449 0.0386 0.0305 0.0254 0.210*** 
 (0.0494) (0.0485) (0.0481) (0.0478) (0.0496) 
Wage coordination     -0.208* 
     (0.111) 
Constant 28.32*** 26.72*** 27.02*** 26.78*** 33.52*** 
 (3.490) (3.324) (3.288) (3.268) (6.299) 
      
Observations 436 436 436 436 258 
R-squared 0.214 0.239 0.254 0.266 0.484 
Number of countries 17 17 17 17 13 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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   Model	  3,	  where	  the	  key	  explanatory	  variable	  is	  FISCAL	  CONTROL,	  is	  also	  in	  line	  with	  my	  expectations	  in	  Hypothesis	  2b.	  FISCAL	  CONTROL	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  99%	  confidence	  level.	  Thus,	  we	  can	  argue	  that	  higher	  shared	  rule	  on	  taxation	  in	  the	  countries	  in	  this	  sample	  ‘brings	  the	  regions	  together’	  and	  bridges	  the	  gaps	  in	  overall	  income	  inequality	  levels	  in	  a	  country.	  While	  FISCAL	  AUTONOMY	  is	  a	  component	  of	  the	  self-­‐rule	  of	  the	  regions,	  FISCAL	  CONTROL	  looks	  at	  how	  regions	  share	  power	  in	  fiscal	  issues	  with	  the	  central	  authority.	  Including	  FISCAL	  CONTROL	  in	  lieu	  of	  FISCAL	  AUTONOMY	  does	  not	  change	  the	  coefficients	  or	  statistical	  significance	  of	  the	  control	  variables.	  Model	  4	  aims	  to	  control	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  FISCAL	  CONTROL	  when	  investigating	  the	  effect	  of	  FISCAL	  AUTONOMY,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  The	  results	  are	  similar	  to	  the	  previous	  two	  models	  in	  that	  the	  signs	  and	  the	  statistical	  significance	  of	  these	  two	  main	  independent	  variables	  do	  not	  change.	  Thus,	  I	  conclude	  that	  the	  self-­‐rule	  component	  of	  fiscal	  authority,	  measured	  by	  FISCAL	  AUTONOMY	  increases	  overall	  income	  inequality,	  while	  the	  shared-­‐rule	  component	  of	  fiscal	  authority,	  measured	  by	  FISCAL	  CONTROL	  decreases	  net	  income	  inequality,	  when	  controlling	  for	  centralized	  aspects	  of	  welfare	  states,	  such	  as	  social	  expenditures,	  social	  security	  transfers	  and	  union	  membership.	  These	  measures	  enable	  us	  to	  analyze	  the	  fiscal	  authority	  of	  regional	  governments	  independently	  of	  their	  revenues	  or	  spending	  (Hooghe	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  In	  Model	  5,	  I	  add	  the	  WAGE	  COORDINATION	  variable	  to	  the	  last	  model	  where	  I	  include	  both	  FISCAL	  AUTONOMY	  and	  FISCAL	  CONTROL	  in	  the	  model,	  and	  the	  results	  are	  as	  expected.	  The	  model	  has	  similar	  results	  to	  the	  previous	  one,	  and	  WAGE	  COORDINATION	  is	  negatively	  and	  significantly	  related	  to	  income	  inequality	  as	  expected.	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Implications	  and	  Alternative	  Arguments	  of	  the	  Quantitative	  Study	  The	  results	  of	  this	  quantitative	  study	  show	  that	  fiscal	  autonomy	  and	  fiscal	  control	  granted	  to	  regions	  in	  the	  OECD	  countries	  in	  Europe	  have	  significant	  impacts	  on	  the	  Gini	  coefficient,	  which	  measures	  national	  income	  inequality	  levels.	  The	  more	  fiscal	  autonomy	  the	  regions	  have,	  the	  higher	  the	  expected	  income	  inequality.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  more	  shared	  rule	  between	  the	  subnational	  regions	  and	  the	  central	  government	  is	  significantly	  associated	  with	  less	  income	  inequality.	  However,	  the	  aggregate	  regional	  authority	  index	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  statistically	  significant,	  and	  thus,	  it	  calls	  for	  caution	  against	  claims	  that	  high	  levels	  of	  regional	  authority	  will	  lead	  to	  higher	  income	  inequality	  under	  all	  circumstances.	  One	  possible	  alternative	  argument	  is	  that	  more	  decentralized	  communities	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  homogenous	  within	  their	  own	  structure	  and	  may	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  redistribute,	  utilizing	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  capital	  of	  their	  own	  community.	  	  This	  system	  can	  lead	  to	  an	  overall	  decrease	  in	  the	  inequality	  scores	  in	  a	  country.	  Thus,	  the	  theory	  is	  tested	  against	  this	  alternative	  argument	  whereby	  decentralized	  structures	  could	  construct	  their	  own	  mechanisms	  to	  better	  tackle	  inequality.	  Also,	  alternatively,	  one	  needs	  to	  look	  at	  cases	  in	  which	  granting	  more	  powers	  to	  subnational	  actors	  would	  decrease	  inequality	  within	  certain	  regions.	  One	  example	  for	  future	  study	  would	  be	  whether	  the	  more	  powers	  Scotland	  gets	  through	  the	  devolution	  process	  will	  be	  associated	  with	  greater	  income	  equalization,	  at	  least	  for	  that	  region,	  given	  the	  policy	  agenda	  of	  the	  Scottish	  National	  Party	  and	  Scottish	  Labour	  Party.	  Yet,	  the	  possibility	  of	  lower	  inequality	  in	  the	  region	  might	  also	  change	  the	  inequality	  levels	  among	  the	  regions.	  Therefore,	  applying	  the	  same	  study	  by	  looking	  at	  regional	  inequality	  levels	  would	  open	  new	  avenues	  for	  research.	  Further	  refinement	  of	  regional	  authority,	  decentralization	  and	  redistribution	  is	  of	  crucial	  importance	  not	  only	  for	  its	  theoretical	  but	  also	  for	  its	  public	  policy	  related	  underpinnings.	  Therefore,	  the	  next	  section	  takes	  Germany	  as	  a	  case	  study	  to	  further	  illuminate	  the	  causal	  mechanism.	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2)	  Federalism,	  Governance	  and	  Inequality:	  The	  Case	  of	  Germany	  The	  quantitative	  exercise	  in	  this	  paper	  aimed	  at	  refining	  the	  dichotomous	  unitary/federal	  approach	  to	  understanding	  the	  importance	  of	  territorial	  governance	  on	  inequality.	  The	  case	  study	  on	  Germany	  examines	  a)	  the	  application	  of	  ‘federalism’	  and	  the	  multi-­‐level	  governance	  structure	  of	  Germany,	  b)	  whether/how	  regional	  authorities	  have	  changed	  over	  the	  recent	  years,	  c)	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  the	  Länder	  for	  financial	  equalization	  and	  taxes,	  and	  how	  
Länder	  are	  represented	  at	  the	  federal	  ‘Bund’	  level	  d)	  how	  the	  territorial	  governance	  structure	  of	  Germany	  enables	  the	  Länder	  and	  the	  federal	  government	  interact	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  regional	  policies.	  By	  doing	  so,	  I	  aim	  to	  further	  illuminate	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  between	  territorial	  governance	  and	  income	  distribution/economic	  inequality.	  This	  case	  study	  looks	  at	  the	  concept	  of	  governance	  through	  a	  multi-­‐level	  lens	  both	  at	  the	  subnational,	  national	  and	  supranational	  (EU)	  levels.	  	  The	  territorial	  governance	  structure	  in	  Germany	  has	  also	  been	  influenced	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  from	  the	  Europeanization	  process	  (Börzel	  2002).	  	  
2a)	  The	  Constitutional	  Structure:	  Federalism	  and	  the	  Multi-­‐Level	  Governance	  
Structure	  in	  Germany	  Germany	  is	  a	  federal	  country	  with	  specified	  competences	  of	  its	  subnational	  levels	  of	  government.	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  parliamentary	  structure,	  the	  federal	  structure	  and	  its	  subnational	  governments	  is	  regarded	  to	  be	  an	  important	  characteristic	  of	  the	  German	  democracy	  (Benz	  and	  Zimmer	  2012).	  	  The	  return	  to	  federalism	  was	  something	  brought	  about	  by	  returning	  to	  democracy	  (Bendel	  and	  Sturm	  2013).	  After	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  territory	  of	  Germany	  was	  restructured	  into	  several	  regions,	  otherwise	  known	  as	  Länder,	  some	  of	  which	  had	  their	  historical	  identities,	  such	  as	  Hamburg	  or	  Bavaria.	  The	  federal	  constitution	  of	  Germany,	  the	  Basic	  Law,	  was	  proclaimed	  in	  1949.	  After	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall,	  with	  the	  German	  unification,	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  welcomed	  five	  new	  Länder.	  	  Currently,	  Germany	  has	  16	  Länder,	  323	  counties	  and	  12,312	  municipalities.	  Except	  for	  Bavaria,	  Hamburg	  and	  Saxony	  (after	  1990),	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  Länder	  do	  not	  correspond	  to	  historical	  allegiances	  (Scharpf	  2008;	  Bendel	  and	  Sturm	  2013).	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Germany	  has	  a	  bicameral	  structure,	  with	  the	  Bundestag9	  and	  Bundesrat	  (German	  
Federal	  Council),	  where	  the	  members	  of	  the	  governments	  of	  the	  Länder	  are	  represented.	  Since	  all	  the	  important	  legislation	  needs	  majorities	  of	  both	  houses,	  this	  indicates	  how	  both	  chambers	  actually	  depend	  on	  each	  other	  (Scharpf	  1988).	  Germany’s	  federal	  structure	  has	  been	  classified	  as	  “federal-­‐decentralized”	  (Thelen	  and	  Karcher	  2013)	  as	  “cooperative	  federalism”	  (Börzel	  2002;	  Gordin	  2009),	  	  “executive	  federalism”	  (Benz	  and	  Zimmer	  2012)	  and	  as	  “unitarian	  federalism”	  (Bendel	  and	  Sturm	  2013)	  among	  many	  other	  classifications	  of	  federalism.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  joint	  decision-­‐making	  (politikverflechtung)	  ensures	  that	  the	  Länder	  are	  represented	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  (Scharpf	  1988;	  Hooghe	  et	  al.	  2010).	  For	  this	  structure	  not	  to	  lead	  to	  	  “joint-­‐decision	  trap”,	  as	  Scharpf	  (1998)	  suggests,	  the	  de	  
facto	  requirement	  of	  unanimous	  decisions	  at	  different	  levels	  need	  to	  be	  managed	  with	  a	  problem	  solving	  decision	  making	  style.	  This	  obviously	  needs	  a	  strong	  steering	  mechanism	  and	  willingness	  by	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  Länder.	  	  On	  a	  similar	  note,	  Beramendi	  (2012)	  stresses	  that	  Germany’s	  compatibility	  between	  its	  federalism	  and	  its	  attempts	  to	  create	  solidarity	  has	  roots	  in	  history	  starting	  from	  the	  Bismarck	  days.	  Therefore,	  this	  case	  study	  is	  an	  exercise	  
	  
2b)	  Regional	  authority	  and	  intergovernmental	  relations	  in	  Germany	  –	  
Political,	  administrative	  and	  financial	  aspects	  –	  Findings	  from	  the	  interviews	  As	  a	  notable	  scholar	  on	  German	  federalism	  asserted	  during	  our	  interviews:	  
“Germany	  is	  not	  really	  in	  the	  process	  of	  ‘decentralizing’,	  so	  it	  is	  not	  correct	  to	  talk	  
about	  ‘decentralization’	  (as	  a	  process)	  in	  Germany.	  Centralization	  of	  the	  system	  is	  very	  
important	  in	  Germany;	  it	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  neo-­‐corporatist	  structure,	  with	  
employers’	  association	  at	  the	  center	  level”,	  noting	  that	  recent	  changes	  in	  the	  federal	  laws	  do	  not	  change	  the	  sharing	  of	  competences	  to	  a	  large	  extent10.	  	  	  	  Despite	  federal	  reforms	  in	  the	  2000s,	  the	  idea	  of	  decentralization	  in	  Germany	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  ongoing	  process	  as	  experienced	  in	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  There	  is	  no	  specific	  ‘upper’	  –	  ‘lower’	  chamber	  distinction	  in	  Germany	  but	  Bundesrat	  is	  known	  as	  the	  upper	  chamber	  in	  many	  sources,	  so	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  it	  accordingly.	  10	  Personal	  interview,	  February	  2014,	  Cologne,	  Germany.	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countries	  like	  Spain,	  where	  the	  sharing	  of	  competences	  between	  different	  levels	  of	  government	  are	  known	  to	  be	  in	  constant	  flux	  (Colino	  and	  Del	  Pino	  2012).	  	  While	  the	  main	  constitutional	  structure	  remains	  intact,	  certain	  reforms	  are	  taking	  place	  that	  have	  changed	  or	  will	  change	  the	  way	  the	  centralized/decentralization	  German	  structure	  is	  held	  together.	  In	  the	  2006	  federal	  reforms,	  the	  competences	  of	  the	  
Länder	  were	  altered	  in	  some	  areas.	  In	  2009,	  the	  Bundestag	  and	  the	  Bundesrat	  approved	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  Germany’s	  fiscal	  federalism.	  The	  first	  stage	  was	  about	  the	  reallocation	  of	  certain	  responsibilities	  between	  the	  Land	  governments	  and	  the	  central	  government.	  Feld	  and	  Baskaran	  (2009)	  argue	  that	  in	  this	  second	  stage,	  despite	  approving	  certain	  reforms,	  the	  decision	  makers	  left	  the	  intergovernmental	  transfer	  scheme	  untouched	  despite	  different	  aims	  in	  the	  beginning,	  leaving	  the	  decisions	  to	  2019.	  Despite	  the	  reforms	  not	  having	  been	  put	  into	  place	  yet,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  take	  a	  look	  at	  what	  the	  fiscal	  federalism	  reforms	  specify.	  With	  this	  reform,	  a	  new	  borrowing	  rule	  –	  the	  debt	  brake	  –	  is	  put	  in	  place,	  which	  will	  be	  valid	  as	  of	  2016	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  and	  in	  2020	  at	  the	  regional	  level.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  prevent	  “excessive	  indebtedness”,	  and	  additional	  transfers	  will	  be	  granted	  to	  Länder	  of	  Saarland,	  Sachsen-­‐Anhalt,	  and	  Schleswig-­‐Holstein,	  creating	  fiscal	  asymmetry	  in	  the	  system	  (Feld	  and	  Baskaran	  2009).	  Auel	  (2008)	  argues	  that	  the	  reform	  process	  of	  2006	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  increase	  of	  powers	  for	  the	  Bund	  level	  because	  it	  has	  become	  obligatory	  for	  the	  
Bundesrat	  to	  give	  consent	  in	  all	  cases	  if	  the	  federal	  legislation	  bears	  any	  costs	  on	  
Länder.	  Overall,	  the	  dominant	  view	  from	  the	  interviews	  was	  that	  these	  reforms	  did	  not	  significantly	  alter	  the	  sharing	  of	  competences	  to	  make	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  redistributive	  policies.	  As	  Germany’s	  federal	  structure	  points	  out	  to	  a	  “functional	  division	  of	  independent	  powers”,	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  claim	  that	  most	  laws	  are	  still	  passed	  at	  the	  federal	  level,	  where	  both	  the	  Bundestag	  and	  the	  Bundesrat	  have	  a	  say,	  but	  then	  the	  implementation	  of	  these	  laws	  are	  left	  to	  the	  Land	  or	  local	  governments	  (Benz	  and	  Zimmer	  2012).	  Also	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Land	  governments	  do	  have	  a	  veto	  in	  Bundesrat	  points	  out	  the	  higher	  ‘interactiveness’	  between	  different	  levels	  in	  the	  system.	  If	  the	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competences	  or	  finances	  of	  the	  Länder	  are	  at	  stake,	  then	  the	  Bundesrat	  has	  to	  approve	  those	  laws	  with	  a	  majority	  (Benz	  and	  Zimmer	  2012).	  To	  explain	  how	  the	  executive-­‐implementation	  type	  of	  federalism	  works	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Germany,	  an	  expert	  explained	  the	  following:	  “Unlike	  Spain,	  the	  Länder	  in	  Germany	  are	  not	  as	  relevant	  for	  determining	  the	  competences,	  but	  they	  are	  influential	  in	  implementing	  the	  decisions.	  For	  example,	  labor	  market	  policy	  is	  under	  federal	  law	  and	  it	  aims	  at	  integrating	  unemployed	  people	  and	  migrants	  into	  the	  labor	  market.	  There	  are	  special	  programs	  –	  active	  labor	  market	  policy	  -­‐	  by	  Länder,	  especially	  in	  those	  where	  there	  are	  social	  democrats	  are	  in	  power.	  These	  kinds	  of	  policies	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  ones	  in	  Sweden.	  These	  policies	  don’t	  cost	  much	  money	  to	  the	  Länder	  and	  they	  concern	  Länder	  more	  at	  the	  ‘implementation’	  stage	  of	  policy	  making.”11	  	  While	  analyzing	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  territorial	  governance	  structure	  on	  inequality,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  examine	  other	  independent	  variables	  factors	  that	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  influence	  inequality	  related	  to	  governance.	  One	  important	  factor	  mentioned	  in	  the	  interviews	  was	  that	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  employment	  in	  Germany	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  income	  inequalities,	  as	  it	  has	  done	  in	  other	  developing	  and	  developed	  nations.	  	  If	  we	  look	  at	  the	  Gini	  inequality	  scores	  in	  Germany,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  national	  interpersonal	  inequality	  has	  seen	  a	  great	  increase	  since	  1990s.	  	  Interviews	  pointed	  out	  to	  the	  commonly	  accepted	  view	  that	  this	  is	  “partly	  because	  of	  
the	  incorporation	  of	  East	  Germany	  to	  the	  system	  of	  Germany”.	  “Germany	  became	  like	  
the	  ‘sick	  man	  of	  Europe’,	  with	  low	  growth	  and	  the	  overburdening	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  
with	  the	  increasing	  of	  services	  and	  transfers”12.	  Unemployment	  had	  risen	  after	  the	  German	  unification	  and	  the	  decade	  of	  2000s	  saw	  unemployment	  rise	  generally,	  going	  from	  7.6%	  in	  April	  2001	  to	  peaking	  at	  11.2%	  in	  August	  2005.13	  The	  table	  below	  shows	  the	  increase	  of	  the	  Gini	  scores	  in	  Germany	  in	  the	  years	  1985	  –	  2011,	  going	  from	  0.25	  to	  0.29	  out	  of	  1.14	  While	  income	  inequality	  has	  risen	  in	  Germany,	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Personal	  interview,	  Cologne,	  Germany,	  February	  2014,	  12	  Personal	  interview	  with	  an	  expert	  on	  German	  federalism,	  Cologne,	  Germany,	  February	  2014.	  13	  Data	  from	  Eurostat,	  accessed	  at	  Google	  Public	  Data.	  14	  The	  higher	  the	  Gini	  score	  is,	  the	  more	  unequal	  the	  country.	  The	  data	  are	  taken	  from	  OECD	  Stat	  Extracts.	  http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=46189	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is	  still	  classified	  to	  be	  among	  the	  “middle	  inequality”	  countries	  in	  Europe,	  in	  the	  same	  group	  as	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Hungary,	  Ireland,	  Luxembourg	  and	  Sweden	  (Gyorgy	  Toth	  and	  Keller	  2013).	  	   	  
Table	  3:	  Germany’s	  Inequality	  Scores	  1985	  -­‐	  1995	  
	  Source:	  OECD	  Statistics.	  1980s	  was	  a	  decade	  of	  stable	  inequality	  but	  after	  late	  1990s	  inequality	  skyrocketed	  in	  Germany.	  	  Schundeln	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  show	  that	  inequality	  proved	  to	  be	  stable	  in	  West	  Germany	  until	  German	  unification	  but	  then	  it	  increased	  especially	  for	  market	  incomes	  and	  wages	  after	  1998.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  “already	  existing	  problems	  
of	  unequal	  financial	  capabilities	  of	  Länder	  were	  substantially	  increased	  after	  German	  
unification”	  (Benz	  and	  Zimmer	  2012).	  As	  explained	  in	  the	  interviews,	  ‘Solidaritat	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job	  seekers	  at	  the	  level	  of	  social	  insurance.	  	  This	  actually	  enabled	  the	  financial	  burden	  to	  be	  borne	  by	  the	  federal	  unemployment	  agency	  and	  this	  decreased	  the	  burden	  of	  the	  Länder.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  an	  expert:	  “Care	  was	  taken	  to	  avoid	  regional	  
inequalities	  between	  different	  Länder.	  Whereas	  in	  the	  past	  the	  employment	  agency	  
had	  to	  find	  applicants	  a	  job	  at	  the	  skill	  level	  of	  the	  applicants,	  now	  the	  job	  seekers	  were	  
obliged	  to	  take	  the	  job	  below	  their	  skill	  level	  if	  the	  agency	  matched	  them	  with	  a	  job.	  
This	  meant	  that	  there	  was	  an	  elimination	  of	  ‘Arbeitslosenhilfe’	  and	  the	  elimination	  of	  
the	  threshold	  of	  the	  formal	  skill	  level	  requirement.	  While	  this	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  
positive	  move	  towards	  securing	  more	  employment,	  it	  also	  increased	  low	  wages	  and	  
‘atypical	  employment’,	  also	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  higher	  overall	  national	  inequality.15	  Grabka	  and	  Frick	  (2013)	  find	  that	  during	  the	  Great	  Recession	  of	  the	  late	  2000s,	  employment	  and	  income	  levels	  remained	  stable,	  and	  that	  the	  flexible	  labor	  arrangements	  and	  the	  federal	  government’s	  ‘aggressive	  stimulus	  packages’	  proved	  to	  be	  beneficial,	  pointing	  out	  to	  the	  unitary	  elements	  of	  its	  federal	  structure	  and	  strong	  central	  steering	  mechanism.	  The	  Unemployment	  Insurance	  is	  actually	  operated	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labor	  and	  the	  Federal	  Employment	  Agency	  and	  the	  local	  governments	  assist	  them.	  Beramendi	  (2012)	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  rates	  of	  contribution	  and	  benefit	  entitlements	  are	  uniform	  throughout	  the	  country.	  Other	  types	  of	  income	  support	  programs,	  such	  as	  sickness	  insurance	  and	  other	  family	  related	  benefits	  are	  funded	  by	  taxes,	  and	  this	  time,	  administered	  both	  by	  the	  federal	  and	  the	  regional	  governments.	  	   Regardless	  of	  its	  federal	  structure,	  the	  redistributive	  component	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  in	  Germany	  is	  not	  considered	  high	  in	  Europe,	  even	  with	  relatively	  progressive	  tax	  structure	  (Van	  den	  Bosch	  and	  Cantillon	  2008).	  As	  one	  expert	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  This	  insight	  was	  provided	  by	  experts	  in	  the	  personal	  interviews	  conducted	  in	  Cologne,	  February	  2014.	  This	  point	  about	  how	  atypical	  employment	  impacted	  inequality	  will	  be	  analyzed	  in	  the	  next	  stages	  of	  the	  project	  by	  looking	  at	  how	  it	  was	  handled	  at	  the	  regional	  level.	  Another	  highlight	  of	  the	  interviews	  was	  the	  discussion	  of	  minimum	  wage	  in	  Germany:	  What	  would	  happen	  if	  Germany	  introduced	  minimum	  wage?	  (and	  it	  has	  since	  been	  introduced	  to	  go	  into	  effect	  in	  201515).	  While	  some	  experts	  argue	  that	  it	  would	  help	  reduce	  income	  inequality,	  others	  argue	  that	  it	  would	  help	  increase	  inequality	  because	  it	  will	  be	  too	  expensive	  for	  certain	  employers.	  One	  argument	  against	  minimum	  wages	  is	  that	  the	  labor	  market	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  naturally	  deal	  with	  this	  and	  the	  jobs	  would	  go	  away.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  argument	  pro-­‐minimum	  wage	  is	  that	  more	  people	  will	  have	  a	  job	  where	  they	  can	  make	  a	  living.	  	  However,	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  living	  costs	  will	  naturally	  mean	  the	  minimum	  wage	  will	  not	  have	  the	  same	  impact	  everywhere	  in	  the	  country.	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claimed	  in	  the	  interviews,	  “The	  redistributive	  component	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  is	  one	  of	  
the	  lowest	  in	  Europe”.	  For	  the	  period	  1981	  –	  2000,	  Mahler	  and	  Jesuit	  (2006)	  have	  studied	  the	  impact	  of	  taxes	  and	  transfers	  on	  inequality	  in	  12	  OECD	  countries.	  During	  this	  time,	  in	  Germany,	  taxes	  and	  transfers	  caused	  a	  reduction	  of	  39	  per	  cent,	  indicating	  a	  medium	  level	  of	  income	  redistribution.	  This	  score	  was	  20	  per	  cent	  in	  the	  US	  and	  between	  40	  and	  50	  per	  cent	  in	  Scandinavian	  countries.	  Grabka	  and	  Frick	  (2013)	  argue	  that	  the	  plans	  of	  the	  government	  to	  reduce	  public	  spending	  on	  families	  with	  low	  income	  and	  a	  general	  cut	  in	  public	  expenditures	  after	  the	  Great	  Recession	  might	  have	  an	  inequality	  inducing	  effect	  in	  the	  medium	  and	  long	  term	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  	  	   	  
2c)	  The	  Aim	  for	  Vertical	  and	  Horizontal	  Equalization:	  Fiscal	  Matters	  in	  
Federalism	  and	  Inequality	  	   The	  overarching	  theme	  of	  many	  of	  the	  interviews	  was	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  complete	  equality	  prevailed	  in	  Germany	  and	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  strives	  to	  	  	  equalize	  regional	  differences	  as	  much	  as	  possible,	  also	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  lower	  national	  inequality16.	  This	  can	  also	  be	  explained	  with	  the	  evolution	  of	  German	  federalism,	  according	  to	  Thelen	  and	  Karcher	  (2013),	  where	  they	  argue	  that	  the	  public	  debates	  center	  on	  the	  inability	  of	  federalism	  to	  provide	  the	  same	  type	  of	  living	  conditions,	  and	  people’s	  dissatisfaction	  with	  it.	  In	  Germany,	  the	  fiscal	  equalization	  scheme	  supposes	  that	  the	  level	  of	  public	  services	  should	  be	  the	  same	  and	  that	  the	  Länder	  would	  have	  the	  same	  level	  of	  public	  support.	  Currently,	  there	  is	  a	  vertical	  distribution	  of	  revenues,	  and	  big	  taxes	  such	  as	  income	  Value	  Added	  Tax	  (VAT)	  and	  corporate	  taxes	  are	  all	  part	  of	  common	  taxes.	  	   	  In	  the	  words	  of	  an	  expert,	  “Centralized	  welfare	  state	  reform	  tackles	  
inequality	  and	  there	  is	  local	  solidarity”.	  Generally	  speaking,	  the	  idea	  of	  uniformity	  between	  Länder	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  central	  equalization	  is	  still	  in	  place	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  I	  do	  not	  examine	  regional	  inequality	  levels	  quantitatively	  in	  this	  paper;	  I	  include	  qualitative	  information.	  When	  focusing	  on	  overall	  national	  interpersonal	  inequality	  levels,	  I	  assume	  that	  higher	  regional	  authority	  would	  also	  be	  correlated	  with	  higher	  national	  interpersonal	  inequality.	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at	  least	  as	  a	  goal,	  and	  tax	  issues	  are	  always	  decided	  at	  the	  central	  (Bund)	  level.	  17	  All	  of	  the	  legislation	  goes	  to	  the	  Bundesrat	  (upper	  chamber)	  and	  the	  2/3	  of	  the	  collected	  tax	  goes	  into	  one	  big	  central	  pot.	  While	  the	  federal	  level	  decides	  on	  the	  tax	  rules	  the	  
Länder	  do	  not	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  propose	  tax	  legislation,	  the	  tax	  administration	  is	  decentralized,	  meaning	  there	  is	  no	  such	  institution	  like	  the	  Internal	  Revenue	  Service	  in	  the	  US.18	  	   In	  other	  words,	  while	  the	  Länder	  do	  not	  have	  financial	  autonomy	  for	  determining	  the	  tax	  levels	  (which	  I	  assume	  is	  conducive	  to	  more	  standardization	  –	  and	  hence	  lower	  inequality),	  it	  is	  also	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  an	  intense	  bargaining	  process	  among	  different	  levels.	  Therefore,	  going	  back	  to	  the	  theory,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
Länder	  and	  the	  federal	  government	  can	  actually	  represent	  themselves	  at	  the	  Bund	  level	  shows	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  ‘shared-­‐rule’.	  In	  general	  terms,	  the	  federal	  government	  collects	  the	  taxes,	  and	  they	  are	  distributed	  to	  the	  Länder.	  That	  has	  been	  modified	  because	  VAT	  is	  not	  allocated	  according	  to	  place	  where	  it	  is	  collected;	  it	  is	  rather	  done	  on	  a	  per	  capita	  basis,	  which	  creates	  an	  equalization	  effect.	  The	  share	  of	  the	  
Länder	  of	  the	  VAT	  is	  distributed	  among	  the	  Länder	  based	  on	  the	  number	  of	  inhabitants.	  If	  some	  Länder	  get	  tax	  revenues	  below	  average,	  they	  get	  additional	  shares.	  However,	  in	  the	  views	  of	  some	  experts,	  this	  can	  also	  lead	  to	  inequalities:	  
“Income	  and	  corporate	  taxes	  are	  allocated	  to	  where	  they	  are	  collected,	  and	  this	  favors	  
rich	  areas”.	  19	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  vertical	  equalization,	  horizontal	  equalization	  grants	  exist	  (Ausgleichszuweisungen)	  among	  the	  Länder,	  which	  are	  distributed	  according	  to	  per	  capita	  for	  each	  of	  the	  Länder.	  For	  example,	  if	  there	  is	  a	  120	  %	  -­‐	  50%	  per	  capita	  difference	  between	  the	  Länder,	  after	  equalization,	  it	  is	  more	  in	  line	  with	  a	  difference,	  such	  as	  105%	  -­‐	  95%,	  but	  the	  ranking	  of	  Länder	  is	  not	  supposed	  to	  change.	  There	  are	  only	  3	  Länder	  (Bavaria,	  Hesse	  and	  Baden-­‐Wurttemberg)	  who	  are	  paying	  and	  most	  are	  at	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  fiscal	  equalization.	  As	  far	  as	  the	  financial	  equalization	  -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  With	  this	  idea	  in	  mind,	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  larger	  project,	  I	  am	  analyzing	  how	  tax	  rules	  have	  been	  decided	  in	  the	  recent	  years	  and	  whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  Länder	  actually	  impacted	  the	  decisions.	  18	  Personal	  interviews,	  Cologne,	  	  Germany,	  February	  2014.	  19	  Personal	  interviews,	  Cologne,	  	  Germany,	  February	  2014.	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“the	  finanzausgleich”	  -­‐	  is	  concerned,	  Bavaria	  and	  Berlin	  are	  very	  important	  Länder.	  When	  a	  rich	  Land	  increases	  the	  revenue,	  then	  it	  is	  taken	  away,	  which	  is	  not	  growth	  oriented	  for	  industrial	  policy	  and	  revenues	  are	  lost	  in	  the	  system.	  For	  example,	  Bavaria	  and	  Hesse	  have	  a	  suit	  impending	  before	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  challenging	  the	  system	  of	  tax	  transfers,	  to	  stop	  subsidizing	  spending	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Berlin	  and	  other	  poorer	  states.20	  	   Overall,	  one	  can	  argue	  that	  this	  federal	  system	  tries	  to	  equalize	  revenue	  based	  on	  needs.	  Therefore,	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  interviews,	  whether	  such	  growth	  inducing	  policies	  are	  actually	  disadvantageous	  in	  terms	  of	  receiving	  need-­‐based	  benefits,	  and	  whether	  regions	  would	  rather	  opt-­‐out	  of	  growing	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  the	  benefits	  -­‐	  leading	  to	  a	  ‘race	  to	  the	  bottom’	  -­‐	  is	  a	  concern.	  There	  are	  also	  additional	  federal	  grants	  for	  Länder	  that	  have	  less	  than	  99.5	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  average	  financial	  capability,	  after	  the	  VAT	  distribution	  and	  the	  horizontal	  equalization	  scheme	  (Benz	  and	  Zimmer	  2010).21	  	  	   As	  stated	  earlier,	  in	  Germany,	  the	  services	  are	  competences	  of	  the	  Länder	  and	  the	  local	  governments.	  Trade	  unions	  in	  the	  Länder	  are	  powerful	  especially	  in	  voicing	  concerns	  about	  social	  insurance.	  Information	  from	  the	  meetings	  suggests	  that	  trade	  unions	  have	  lost	  influence	  in	  the	  recent	  years	  but	  they	  achieved	  a	  lot	  in	  the	  past.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  trade	  unions	  had	  a	  strong	  voice	  in	  the	  reforms	  of	  2004,	  and	  unions	  mobilized	  against	  the	  government.	  One	  interviewee	  claimed	  the	  following:	  “In	  fiscal	  equalization,	  the	  non-­‐state	  actors	  are	  active	  when	  it	  concerns	  taxes,	  but	  it	  is	  
pretty	  much	  an	  insider	  game,	  meaning	  that	  ‘politics	  ‘actually	  shape	  the	  outcomes	  and	  
even	  parties	  are	  not	  involved”.	  As	  a	  professor	  in	  Cologne,	  Germany	  described,	  the	  general	  principle	  in	  Germany	  is	  that	  ‘All	  the	  parties	  oppose	  and	  rule	  at	  the	  same	  
time’.22	  The	  same	  idea	  applies	  to	  the	  welfare	  policies	  as	  well.	  Bargaining	  is	  also	  conducted	  at	  the	  regional	  level	  but	  then	  the	  policies	  are	  implemented	  in	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Financial	  Times,	  “States	  challenge	  Germany’s	  subsidies”,	  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a1968c60-­‐6fb9-­‐11e2-­‐8785-­‐00144feab49a.html#axzz3TEJXo6Cl	  	  21Benz	  and	  Zimmer	  (2010)	  use	  data	  from	  the	  Federal	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  (Bundesministerium	  der	  Finanzen	  (2008).	  22	  Personal	  interview,	  Heinrich-­‐Heine	  University	  of	  Dusseldorf,	  Germany,	  February	  2014.	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centralized	  manner.	  Who	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  bargaining	  process?	  In	  the	  bargaining	  process,	  political	  parties	  link	  Bundestag	  and	  Bundesrat	  together.	  Also,	  Länder	  function	  as	  subnational	  units	  but	  their	  representatives	  are	  part	  of	  the	  federal	  party	  system,	  again	  pointing	  to	  the	  interactiveness	  in	  the	  system.	  23	  	  	  	   Unlike	  Spain,	  the	  Länder	  in	  Germany	  do	  not	  have	  the	  relevant	  competences	  for	  policies	  regarding	  inequality,	  however	  they	  implement	  decisions.	  For	  example,	  labor	  market	  policy	  is	  under	  federal	  law	  and	  it	  aims	  at	  integrating	  unemployed	  people	  and	  migrants	  into	  the	  labor	  market.	  There	  are	  special	  programs	  –	  active	  labor	  market	  policy	  -­‐	  by	  Länder,	  especially	  in	  those	  where	  there	  are	  social	  democratic	  parties	  and	  the	  eastern	  Länder.	  At	  the	  local	  level,	  municipalities	  are	  important	  for	  designing	  market	  policies	  –	  services	  and	  infrastructures.	  For	  example	  in	  Dortmund,	  the	  antipoverty	  policies	  are	  implemented	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  related	  to	  the	  increase	  of	  local	  discretion	  with	  the	  Hartz	  reforms	  of	  2000s.	  24	  	  	  
2d)	  The	  Role	  of	  North	  Rhine-­‐Westphalia	  in	  Implementing	  EU	  Policies25	  North	  Rhine-­‐Westphalia	  (NRW)	  is	  the	  most	  populous	  and	  fourth	  largest	  Land	  by	  size	  in	  Germany,	  with	  its	  capital	  in	  Dusseldorf	  and	  its	  largest	  city	  of	  Cologne.	  NRW	  is	  one	  of	  the	  oldest	  subnational	  units	  in	  Germany.	  The	  Länder	  are	  in	  many	  cases	  older	  than	  the	  federal	  government.	  NRW	  was	  founded	  in	  1946,	  whereas	  the	  federal	  government	  was	  founded	  in	  1949.	  NRW	  was	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  coal	  and	  steel	  industry	  until	  the	  1970s	  but	  then	  there	  was	  a	  transition	  to	  services	  and	  research	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  	  The	  concept	  of	  ‘interactive	  governance’	  is	  borrowed	  from	  Torfing	  et	  al.	  (2012).	  The	  importance	  of	  party	  decentralization	  and	  party	  coalitions	  manifests	  itself	  in	  policy	  making.	  	  There	  are	  different	  coalitions	  at	  the	  Bundestag	  (CDU/CSU	  and	  SPD)	  and	  at	  the	  Bundesrat	  level.	  Currently,	  there	  are	  some	  a)	  Länder	  with	  Social	  Democrat	  coalition	  with	  Greens,	  b)	  Länder	  with	  coalition	  of	  Christian	  Democrats	  and	  Liberals	  (such	  as	  Sachsen).	  For	  future	  iterations	  of	  this	  project,	  I	  am	  analyzing	  the	  meeting	  minutes	  of	  the	  Bundesrat	  (interest	  groups	  –	  working	  groups)	  –	  which	  are	  available	  after	  1990s.	  This	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  understand	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  their	  representation	  at	  the	  federal	  level,	  going	  back	  to	  the	  theory	  tested	  in	  the	  quantitative	  part.	  	  24	  Dorothee	  Spannagel.	  Work	  Package	  6	  –	  The	  Local	  Arena	  for	  Combating	  Poverty	  Local	  Report:	  Germany	  FP7	  project	  ‘Combating	  Poverty	  in	  Europe:	  Re-­‐organising	  Active	  Inclusion	  through	  Participatory	  and	  Integrated	  Modes	  of	  Multilevel	  Governance’,	  http://cope-­‐research.eu/wp-­‐content/uploads/2013/11/COPE_WP6_Germany_Dortmund.pdf	  	  25	  Information	  in	  this	  section	  is	  based	  on	  interviews	  with	  official	  representatives	  of	  North	  Rhein-­‐Westphalia	  in	  Düsseldorf	  (Land	  level	  -­‐	  Staatskanzlei)	  and	  Berlin	  (Bund	  level)	  and	  at	  Hans-­‐Bockler-­‐Stiftung,	  carried	  out	  in	  February	  2014,	  and	  author’s	  own	  elaboration	  of	  those	  interviews.	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development.	  With	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  creative	  economy	  and	  the	  Internet	  and	  fashion	  industries,	  NRW	  thrived	  and	  currently	  95%	  of	  workers	  work	  in	  small	  and	  medium	  enterprises.	  	  	   As	  explained	  earlier,	  negotiations	  about	  redistributive	  tax	  policies	  take	  place	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  with	  representation	  from	  both	  Bund	  and	  Land	  levels,	  but	  they	  are	  centrally	  coordinated.	  As	  a	  NRW	  official	  stated,	  “Länder	  do	  not	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  
propose	  tax	  legislation.	  The	  Bund	  level	  is	  very	  powerful	  in	  taxes	  and	  we	  need	  to	  
influence	  that”.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  European	  Union’s	  (EU)	  policies	  that	  aim	  at	  poverty	  and	  inequality	  reducing	  mainly	  take	  place	  at	  the	  regional	  level	  and	  target	  regions.	  In	  this	  subsection,	  I	  draw	  from	  qualitative	  data	  gathered	  in	  NRW	  about	  the	  role	  of	  NRW	  and	  Länder	  in	  implementing	  EU	  policies	  general	  in	  policies	  that	  matter	  for	  inequality.	  	   As	  a	  highly	  industrialized	  Land,	  NRW	  also	  has	  a	  high	  representative	  profile	  at	  the	  European	  Union	  level.	  In	  EU’s	  operational	  programs,	  the	  50%	  is	  co-­‐financed	  by	  the	  member	  states,	  and	  the	  other	  50%	  by	  the	  EU.	  As	  the	  official	  representative	  of	  NRW	  expressed:	  “Between	  the	  three	  funds	  (Regional	  Development	  Fund,	  Agricultural	  
Fund	  and	  European	  Social	  Fund),	  coordination	  is	  crucial	  to	  prevent	  overlap	  and	  
cooperation	  is	  necessary	  with	  the	  EU	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  relevant	  national	  actors	  
implement	  the	  EU	  funds.	  Therefore,	  the	  coordination	  procedure,	  through	  which	  the	  
subnational	  units	  and	  the	  federal	  government	  share	  power,	  is	  very	  important	  and	  
NRW	  is	  successful	  in	  in	  managing	  this	  process.	  We	  also	  need	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  
European	  Commission	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  devolved	  priorities	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  
structural	  funds	  are	  carried	  out	  ”.	  This	  view	  is	  line	  with	  Börzel’s	  (2002)	  explanation	  of	  the	  dilemma	  that	  the	  regions	  faced	  during	  the	  ‘Europeanization’	  process.	  They	  would	  either	  ‘roll-­‐back’	  because	  of	  losing	  some	  of	  their	  competences	  to	  the	  European	  level,	  or	  they	  would	  use	  this	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  “rein	  in”	  with	  their	  expertise,	  spending	  power	  and	  administrative	  capacity	  for	  applying	  the	  European	  policies,	  and	  Börzel	  (2002)	  argues	  that	  the	  latter	  prevailed,	  as	  my	  interviewees	  also	  stated.	  	   As	  expressed	  by	  representatives	  of	  NRW	  in	  Berlin,	  in	  the	  dissemination	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  regional	  funds,	  the	  EU	  institutions	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	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the	  Länder	  whereby	  the	  Länder	  have	  the	  role	  of	  ‘informal	  lobbying’,	  for	  example	  at	  the	  Committee	  of	  Regions	  of	  the	  EU.	  The	  same	  applies	  to	  the	  Land	  –	  Bund	  relations	  as	  well.	  When	  the	  Bundesrat	  moved	  to	  Berlin	  in	  2002,	  the	  NRW	  representation	  also	  followed	  suit	  and	  opened	  a	  representation	  in	  Berlin.	  This	  representation	  has	  an	  important	  role	  within	  the	  federal	  lawmaking	  process,	  especially	  in	  the	  Bundesrat.	  They	  have	  roles	  with	  different	  intensities	  concerning	  the	  ‘Zustimmunggesetz”	  (act	  of	  assent)	  whereby	  the	  Länder	  has	  the	  say	  in	  the	  Bundesrat.	  90%	  of	  the	  federal	  legislation	  goes	  to	  Bundestag	  (through	  mediation	  committees)	  and	  then	  to	  
Bundesrat.	  	  	   How	  is	  the	  “fight	  with	  inequality”	  carried	  out	  at	  the	  regional	  level?	  At	  the	  
Länder	  level,	  the	  emphasis	  is	  on	  regional	  development	  and	  certain	  social	  programs.	  As	  of	  1980s	  and	  with	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty,	  the	  EU	  became	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  made	  up	  of	  “regions”.	  As	  the	  official	  representative	  of	  NRW	  in	  Berlin	  stated:	  “Smaller	  parts	  of	  NRW	  are	  more	  unequal.	  For	  example,	  Düsseldorf	  is	  rich,	  but	  
the	  Ruhr	  Valley	  is	  poor,	  with	  the	  highest	  rate	  of	  unemployment.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  
representatives	  of	  Länder,	  such	  as	  NRW,	  act	  as	  ‘informal	  lobbyists’	  who	  are	  not	  
formally	  a	  part	  of	  the	  decision	  making	  process.	  But	  we	  get	  in	  touch	  with	  
Commissioners	  to	  talk	  about	  issues	  that	  interest	  the	  NRW,	  such	  as	  regional	  
development.	  Therefore,	  we	  see	  formal	  and	  informal	  channels	  of	  representation	  
converging	  for	  the	  same	  types	  of	  goals	  (pointing	  to	  more	  shared	  rule)”.	  As	  far	  as	  the	  European	  Social	  Fund	  is	  concerned,	  the	  new	  Eastern	  European	  members	  currently	  get	  a	  bigger	  share,	  so	  the	  share	  of	  older	  EU	  members	  is	  decreasing.	  When	  these	  funds	  are	  allocatedö	  usually,	  the	  poorest	  regions	  and	  also	  issues	  that	  require	  ‘excellence’	  which	  needs	  funding,	  such	  as	  universities,	  research	  and	  development	  get	  the	  funds	  from	  the	  EU.	  Also,	  issues	  of	  general	  politics,	  such	  as	  climate	  change	  and	  justice-­‐police	  collaboration	  get	  funded	  and	  these	  are	  specifically	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  NRW,	  including	  electricity	  from	  coal	  and	  supply.	  Certain	  funds	  also	  go	  to	  research	  and	  programs	  regarding	  minimum	  wages	  and	  social	  inequality	  issues.	  Whether	  the	  states	  should	  decide	  on	  the	  minimum	  wage	  is	  another	  issue	  of	  concern	  that	  has	  a	  bearing	  on	  regional	  inequalities.	  
	   27	  
	   The	  NRW	  officials	  argue	  that	  the	  region	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  implement	  projects	  with	  the	  EU	  Regional	  funds	  which	  all	  have	  to	  be	  co-­‐financed	  at	  25%,	  as	  expressed	  by	  the	  NRW	  officials.	  Related	  to	  the	  territorial	  governance	  structure	  however,	  not	  all	  the	  Länder	  have	  the	  experts	  and	  the	  trained	  personnel,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  administrative	  capacity	  to	  implement	  the	  policies.	  The	  federal	  structure	  inevitably	  leads	  to	  certain	  disparities	  between	  the	  regions.	  As	  far	  as	  the	  budget	  is	  concerned,	  NRW	  has	  no	  more	  public	  debt	  and	  after	  2020,	  there	  will	  be	  no	  more	  borrowing.	  20%	  is	  spent	  on	  interest	  rates.	  The	  federal	  ‘Bund’	  is	  structured	  so	  that	  there	  are	  16	  Länder	  and	  less	  than	  30%	  is	  spent	  on	  staff.	  The	  rest	  goes	  to	  social	  security,	  defense,	  traffic	  and	  investments.	  The	  Länder	  spend	  around	  50%	  on	  staff	  (teachers,	  police,	  courts).	  The	  budget	  of	  the	  ‘Bund’	  is	  quite	  flexible	  while	  at	  the	  
Länder	  level,	  this	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  case.	  There	  are	  not	  substantial	  differences	  in	  salaries,	  not	  more	  than	  before,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  Länder	  cannot	  introduce	  or	  fight	  for	  great	  changes	  in	  that	  regard,	  again	  indicating	  an	  aim	  leaning	  towards	  equalization	  and	  standardization.	  Still,	  some	  Länder	  are	  trying	  to	  compete	  with	  each	  other	  by	  attracting	  teachers	  to	  their	  region,	  as	  most	  public	  employees	  are	  mostly	  employed	  at	  the	  Länder	  level.	  This	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  a	  decentralized	  structure	  actually	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  ‘race	  to	  the	  bottom’	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  conditions	  but	  more	  a	  race	  towards	  attracting	  employees.	  Beramendi	  (2012)	  summarizes	  the	  system	  in	  Germany	  as	  follows:	  “This	  equal	  treatment	  of	  individuals	  across	  unequal	  
territories,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  significant	  share	  of	  the	  social	  policy	  efforts	  is	  either	  fully	  
funded	  and	  administered	  or	  implemented	  by	  subnational	  governments,	  raises	  once	  
again	  the	  problem	  of	  resource	  allocation	  across	  different	  territories”	  (p.138).	  	  
Summing	  it	  Up:	  The	  Case	  of	  Germany	  	   As	  the	  literature	  shows,	  federalism	  makes	  a	  country	  prone	  to	  political,	  administrative	  and	  economic	  diversity.	  The	  quantitative	  exercise	  and	  the	  German	  case	  study	  are	  attempts	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  territorial	  governance	  structure	  is	  significantly	  associated	  with	  income	  distribution	  and	  income	  inequality.	  Germany	  has	  experienced	  increases	  in	  inequality,	  especially	  after	  the	  unification.	  	  However,	  it	  still	  retains	  its	  position	  as	  a	  mid-­‐level	  inequality	  country	  in	  Europe	  despite	  its	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changes	  in	  the	  labor	  market	  structure,	  helped	  by	  its	  redistributive	  federal	  policies.	  Since	  the	  competences	  of	  the	  regions	  have	  not	  changed	  dramatically	  to	  the	  extent	  they	  will	  impact	  the	  overall	  welfare	  state	  and	  redistribution	  levels,	  we	  cannot	  yet	  attribute	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  Gini	  scores	  to	  constitutional	  changes	  in	  relations	  between	  levels	  of	  governance.	  	  The	  ongoing	  fiscal	  federalism	  reforms	  will	  shed	  more	  light	  on	  this	  issue	  for	  future	  research.	  However,	  interviews	  corroborate	  the	  literature	  that	  official	  intergovernmental	  mechanisms	  set	  in	  the	  federal	  structure	  of	  Germany	  for	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  coordination	  among	  the	  regions	  are	  effective	  in	  sustaining	  the	  welfare	  state	  and	  achieving	  consensus,	  in	  a	  context	  challenged	  by	  the	  unification,	  and	  then	  to	  some	  extent,	  the	  recession.	  Furthermore,	  the	  regions	  have	  important	  –	  but	  asymmetric	  according	  to	  their	  needs	  and	  capabilities	  –	  roles	  in	  terms	  of	  administering	  EU’s	  regional	  policies.	  Therefore,	  evidence	  points	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  centripetal	  Germany,	  whereby	  the	  ‘culture’	  and	  the	  ‘laws’	  are	  in	  place,	  with	  –	  at	  least	  –	  the	  aim	  of	  achieving	  interpersonal	  standardization	  of	  welfare	  services	  which	  would	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  reducing	  or	  at	  least	  sustaining	  mid-­‐level	  overall	  inequality	  levels	  in	  Europe.	  Studies	  have	  shown	  that	  taxes	  and	  transfers	  achieve	  in	  reducing	  inequality	  at	  39	  per	  cent	  –	  medium	  level	  -­‐	  in	  Germany	  (Mahler	  and	  Jesuit	  2006).	  The	  unequal	  aspect	  of	  the	  federal	  structure	  has	  more	  implications	  for	  increasing	  inequality	  among	  the	  Länder	  rather	  than	  among	  persons,	  while	  the	  centrally	  decided	  redistribution	  system	  achieves	  its	  roles	  of	  achieving	  standardization	  to	  a	  considerable	  extent.	  	   Even	  though	  the	  Länder	  do	  not	  have	  the	  autonomy	  at	  their	  own	  level	  to	  decide	  on	  fiscal	  rules	  that	  would	  matter	  for	  inequality,	  intergovernmental	  relations	  are	  more	  effective	  especially	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  representation	  of	  Länder	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  through	  the	  Bundesrat.	  Furthermore,	  the	  fiscal	  federalism	  reforms,	  which	  will	  be	  in	  effect	  as	  of	  2019,	  foresee	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “stability	  council”	  which	  will	  be	  made	  up	  of	  the	  federal	  finance	  minister,	  the	  federal	  economy	  minister	  and	  the	  Länder	  finance	  ministers.	  This	  can	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  a	  possible	  increase	  in	  the	  cooperation	  between	  different	  levels	  towards	  similar	  financial	  goals	  throughout	  the	  country	  (Feld	  and	  Baskaran	  2009).	  Despite	  fiscal	  policies	  being	  centrally	  determined,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  shows	  a	  commitment	  to	  unity	  also	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bolsters	  the	  shared-­‐rule	  component	  of	  federalism.	  As	  Börzel	  (2002)	  stated,	  “the	  
formal	  institutions	  of	  German	  federalism	  are	  embedded	  in	  an	  institutional	  culture	  
which	  favors	  multilateral	  bargaining	  and	  consensus-­‐seeking	  as	  the	  most	  appropriate	  
behavior	  in	  territorial	  politics”	  (p.49).	  	  	  
	  
Bibliography:	  	  
• Alderson,	   Arthur,	   and	   François	   Nielsen.	   2002.	   Globalization	   and	   the	   Great	   U-­‐Turn:	   Income	   Inequality	   Trends	   in	   16	   OECD	   Countries.	   American	   Journal	   of	  
Sociology	  107	  (5):	  1244-­‐1299.	  	  
• Alderson,	  Arthur	  S.	  and	  Kevin	  Doran.	  2013.	  “How	  Has	  Income	  Inequality	  Grown?	  The	  shaping	  of	  the	  Income	  Distribution	  in	  LIS	  Countries.”;	  "Istvan	  Gyorgy	  Toth	  and	  Tamas	  Keller.	  "Income	  Distribution,	  Inequality	  Perceptions,	  and	  Redistributive	  Preferences	  in	  European	  Countries",	  in	  Janet	  Gornick	  and	  Markus	  Jäntti	  (eds.).	  Income	  Inequality:	  Economic	  Disparities	  and	  the	  Middle	  Class	  in	  
Affluent	  Countries.	  Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  pp.51	  -­‐	  74.	  	  	  
• Armingeon,	  Klaus,	  David	  Weisstanner,	  Sarah	  Engler,	  Panajotis	  Potolidis,	  Marlène	  Gerber,	   Philipp	   Leimgruber.	   Comparative	   Political	   Data	   Set	   I	   1960-­‐2009,	  Institute	  of	  Political	  Science,	  University	  of	  Berne	  2011.	  	  
• Auel,	  Kartin.	  2008.	  ‘Still	  no	  exit	  from	  the	  joint	  decision	  trap:	  the	  German	  federal	  reform(s)',	  German	  Politics,	  17,	  4:	  424-­‐439.	  
• Bendel,	   Petra	   and	  Roland	  Sturm.	  2013.	   "Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany",	   in	  Luis	  Moreno	   and	   Cesar	   Colino	   (eds.),	   Diversity	   and	   Unity	   in	   Federal	   Countries.	  Montreal:	  McGill-­‐Queen's	  University	  Press.	  
• Benz,	  Arthur	  and	  Christina	  Zimmer.	  2012.	  "Germany:	  Varieties	  of	  democracy	  in	  a	  Federal	   System";	   Cesar	   Colino	   and	   Eloisa	   del	   Pino.	   2012.	   "Spain:	   The	  Consolidation	   of	   Strong	   Reigonal	   Governments	   and	   the	   Limits	   of	   Local	  Decentralization"	   in	   The	   Oxford	  Handbook	   of	   Local	   and	   Regional	   Democracy	   in	  
Europe,	   John	   Loughlin,	   Frank	   Hendriks	   and	   Anders	   Lidstrom	   (eds).	   Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  	  
• Beramendi,	   Pablo.	   2012.	   The	   Political	   Geography	   of	   Inequality:	   Regions	   and	  
Redistribution.	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	   	  
	   30	  
• Beramendi,	  Pablo.	  2007.	  Federalism.	  In	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Comparative	  Politics,	  Carles	  Boix	  and	  Susan	  Stokes	  (eds.)	  ,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  	  
• Björklund,	  Anders.	  1991.	  Unemployment	  and	   Income	  Distribution:	  Time-­‐Series	  Evidence	  from	  Sweden.	  The	  Scandinavian	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  93	  (3):	  457-­‐465.	  	  
• Blinder,	  Alan	  S.,	  and	  Howard	  Y.	  Esaki.	  1978.	  Macroeconomic	  Activity	  and	  Income	  Distribution	  in	  the	  Postwar	  United	  States.	  Review	  of	  Economics	  and	  Statistics	  60	  (4):	  604-­‐609.	  	  
• Boix,	  Carles.	  1998.	  Political	  Parties,	  Growth	  and	  Equality:	  Conservative	  and	  Social	  
Democratic	   Economic	   Strategies	   in	   the	   World	   Economy.	   New	   York:	   Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  
• Boix,	  Carles.	  2003.	  Democracy	  and	  Redistribution.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  
• Boix,	  Carles.	  2010.	  Origins	  and	  Persistence	  of	  Economic	  Inequality.	  Annual	  
Review	  of	  Political	  Science	  13:	  489-­‐516.	  	  
• Börzel,	  Tanja.	  2002.	  States	  and	  Regions	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  
• Buse,	  Adolf.	  1982.	  The	  Cyclical	  Behaviour	  of	   the	  Size	  Distribution	  of	   Income	   in	  Canada:	  1947-­‐78.	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  15	  (2):	  189-­‐204.	  	  
• Cusack,	  Thomas	  R.;	  Torben	  Iversen	  and	  Philipp	  Rehm.	  2008.	  'Economic	  Shocks,	  Inequality,	  and	  Popular	  Support	  for	  Redistribution',	  'Social	  Rights,	  Welfare	  Generosity,	  and	  Inequality',	  "	  in	  Democracy,	  Inequality	  and	  Representation,	  edited	  by	  Pablo	  Beramendi	  and	  Christopher	  J.	  Anderson.	  New	  York:	  Russell	  Sage	  Foundation.	  	  
• Elazar,	   Daniel.	   1997.	   'Contrasting	   Unitary	   and	   Federal	   Systems',	   International	  
Political	  Science	  Review,	  18	  (3),	  pp.237–251.	  	  
• Esping-­‐Andersen,	   Gosta.	   1990.	   The	   Three	   Worlds	   of	   Welfare	   Capitalism.	  Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press.	  
 
• Feld,	  Lars	  P.	  and	  Thushyanthan	  Baskaran.	  2009.	  Federalism	  Commission	  II	  –	  Recent	  Reforms	  of	  Federal	  Länder	  Financial	  Relationships	  in	  German,	  Forum	  of	  
Federations	  Publications,	  Fall	  2009.	  	  
• Glaeser,	   Edward	   L.	   2006.	   'Inequality',	   Torben	   Iversen,	   'Capitalism	   and	  Democracy',	   Jurgen	   von	   Hagen,	   'Political	   Economy	   of	   Fiscal	   Institutions',	  
	   31	  
Jonathan	  A.	  Rodden,	  'Federalism'	  	  	  	  in	  Barry	  R.	  Weingast	  and	  Donald	  A.	  Wittman,	  
The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Political	  Economy.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
• Gordin,	  Jorge.	  2009.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Fiscal	  Decentralization	  Revisited:	  a	  Typology	  and	  Comparative	  Evidence,	  Revue	  Fédéralisme-­‐Régionalisme,	  9	  (2).	  	  
• Grabka,	  Markus	  M.	  and	  Joachim	  R.	  Frick.	  2013."Country	  case	  study	  -­‐	  Germany",	  in	   Stephen	   P.	   Jenkins,	   Andrea	   Brandolini,	   John	   Micklewright	   and	   Brian	   Nolan	  (eds.)	   The	   Great	   Recession	   and	   the	   Distribution	   of	   Household	   Income,	   Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.,	  pp.90-­‐112.	  	  
• Gramlich,	  E.	  1973.	  State	  and	  Local	  Fiscal	  Behaviour	  and	  Federal	  Grant	  Policy,	   in	  Selected	  Essays	  of	  Edward	  M.	  Gramlich,	  Norhampton,	  MA:	  Edward	  Elgar.	  	  
• Gustafsson,	  Björn,	  and	  Mats	  Johansson.	  1999.	  In	  Search	  of	  Smoking	  Guns:	  What	  Makes	   Income	   Inequality	   Vary	   Over	   Time	   in	   Different	   Countries?	   American	  
Sociological	  Review	  64	  (4):	  585-­‐605.	  	  
• Hague,	   Rod,	   and	   Martin	   Harrop.	   2004.	   Political	   Science:	   A	   Comparative	  
Introduction.	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  	  
• Heston,	  Alan,	  	  Robert	  Summers	  and	  Bettina	  Aten,	  Penn	  World	  Table	  Version	  7.0,	  Center	   for	   International	   Comparisons	   of	   Production,	   Income	   and	   Prices	   at	   the	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania,	  May	  2011.	  	  
• Hooghe,	  Liesbet,	  Gary	  Marks,	  Arjan	  H.	  Schakel.	  2008.	  "Regional	  Authority	   in	  42	  Democracies,	   1950–2006:	   A	   Measure	   and	   Five	   Hypotheses,"	   Regional	   and	  
Federal	  Studies,	  18,	  2-­‐3:	  111-­‐302.	  
• Hooghe,	   L.,	   Marks,	   G.	   &	   Schakel,	   A.	   J.	   (2010).	  The	  Rise	   of	  Regional	  Authority:	  A	  
Comparative	  Study	  of	  42	  Democracies,	  New	  York:	  Routledge.	  
• Linz,	  Juan	  and	  Alfred	  Stepan.	  2000.	  'Inequality	  Inducing	  and	  Inequality	  Reducing	  Federalism',	  Unpublished	  paper,	  IPSA	  Meetings,	  Quebec	  City.	  
• Hooghe,	  Liesbet,	  Gary	  Marks,	  Arjan	  H.	  Schakel.	  2010.	  The	  Rise	  of	  Regional	  
Authority:	  A	  Comparative	  Study	  of	  42	  Democracies,	  New	  York:	  Routledge.	  	  
• Jenkins,	  S.	  and	  J.	  Micklewright.	  2007.	  Inequality	  and	  Poverty	  Re-­‐examined.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
• Kenworthy,	  Lane.	  2001.	  Wage	  Setting	  Coordination	  Scores.	  http://lanekenworthy.net/data/	  	  
• Kenworthy,	  Lane.	  2004.	  Egalitarian	  Capitalism.	  New	  York:	  Russell	  Sage	  Foundation.	  
	   32	  
	  
• Kenworthy,	  Lane	  and	  Pontusson,	  Jonas.	  2005.	  Rising	  Inequality	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Redistribution	  in	  Affluent	  Countries.	  Perspectives	  on	  Politics	  3.	  449-­‐471.	  
• Lupu,	  Noam	  and	  Jonas	  Pontusson.	  2011.	  The	  Structure	  of	  Inequality	  and	  Politics	  of	  Redistribution.	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review	  105	  (2):	  316-­‐336.	  	  
• Mahler,	   V.A.,	   and	   D.K.	   Jesuit.	   2006.	   ‘Fiscal	   redistribution	   in	   the	   developed	  countries:	   new	   insights	   from	   the	   Luxembourg	   Income	   Study’,	   Socio-­‐Economic	  
Review	  4:	  483–511.	  	  
• Marks,	   Gary,	   Liesbet	   Hooghe,	   	   Arjan	   H.	   Schakel.	   2008.	   	   Patterns	   of	   Regional	  Authority,	  Regional	  &	  Federal	  Studies,	  18:2-­‐3,	  167-­‐181.	  
• Moene,	   Karl.	   and	  Michael	  Wallerstein,	   2003.	   'Earnings	   Inequality	   and	  Welfare	  State	  Spending'.	  World	  Politics	  55	  (4):	  485	  -­‐	  516.	  
 
• Oates,	  Wallace.	  1972.	  Fiscal	  Federalism.	  New	  York:	  Harcourt.	  	  
• OECD,	  'Divided	  We	  Stand',	  December	  2011	  http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/dividedwestandwhyinequalitykeepsrising.htm	  	  
• Pierson,	   Paul.	   1995.	   Fragmented	   Welfare	   States:	   Federal	   Institutions	   and	   the	  Development	  of	  Social	  Policy.	  Governance,	  8:	  449	  –	  478.	  	  
• Polity	  IV	  Dataset.	  Polity	  IV	  Project:	  Political	  Regime	  Characteristics	  and	  Transitions,	  1800-­‐2010,	  Monty	  G.	  Marshall,	  Keith	  Jaggers	  and	  Ted	  Robert	  Gurr.	  	  	  
• Qian,	   Yingyi,	   and	   Barry	   R	   Weingast.	   1997.	   Federalism	   as	   a	   Commitment	   to	  Perserving	  Market	   Incentives.	  The	   Journal	  of	  Economic	  Perspectives	   11	   (4):	   83-­‐92.	  	  
• Reuveny,	   Rafael,	   and	   Quan	   Li.	   2003.	   Economic	   Openness,	   Democracy,	   and	  Income	  Inequality.	  Comparative	  Political	  Studies	  36	  (5):	  575-­‐601.	  	  
• Rodden,	   Jonathan.	   	   2004.	   Comparative	   Federalism	   and	   Decentralization.	   On	  Meaning	  and	  Measurement,	  Comparative	  Politics,	  36,	  481–499.	  	  
• Scharpf,	  Fritz.	  1988.	  The	  Joint-­‐decision	  Trap:	  Lessons	  from	  German	  Federalism.	  
Public	  Administration.	  66	  (3),	  pp.	  239–278.	  	  
• Solt,	   Frederick.	   2009.	   “Standardizing	   the	   World	   Income	   Inequality	  Database.”	  Social	  Science	  Quarterly	  90(2):231-­‐242.	  SWIID	  Version	  3.0,	  July	  2010.	  	  
	   33	  
• Stiglitz,	   Joseph.	   2012.	   The	   Price	   of	   Inequality:	   How	   Today's	   Divided	   Society	  Endangers	  Our	  Future.	  	  	  
• Thelen,	  Kathleen	  and	  Sebastian	  Karcher.	  2013.	  "Resilience	  and	  Change	  in	  Federal	  Institutions:	  The	  Case	  of	   the	  German	  Federal	  Council",	   in	  Arthur	  Benz	  and	   Jorg	  Broschek	   (eds.)	   Federal	   Dynamics:	   Continuity,	   Change	   and	   the	   Varieties	   of	  
Federalism.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
• Torfing,	   Jacob,	   B.	   Guy	   Peters,	   Jon	   Pierre	   and	   Eva	   Sorensen.	   2012.	   Interactive	  
Governance.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
• Treisman,	   D.	   2007.	   The	   Architecture	   of	   Government.	   Rethinking	   Political	  
Decentralization.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	   	  
• Wallerstein,	   Michael.	   1999.	   Wage-­‐setting	   Institutions	   and	   Pay	   Inequality	   in	  Advanced	  Industrial	  Societies.	  American	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science	  43	  (3):	  649-­‐680.	  
• Weil,	   Gordon.	   1984.	   Cyclical	   and	   Secular	   Influences	   on	   the	   Size	  Distribution	  of	  Personal	  Income	  in	  the	  UK:	  Some	  Econometric	  Tests.	  Applied	  Economics	  16	  (5):	  749-­‐756.	  	  	  
Appendix	  1:	  
Control	  Variables	  of	  the	  Quantitative	  Study	  Since	  unemployment	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  indicators	  equality	  in	  the	  literature	  (Albani	  2007,	  Björklund	  1991;	  Blinder	  and	  Esaki	  1978;	  Buse	  1982;	  Gustafsson	  and	  Johansson	  1999;	  Weil	  1984),	  I	  use	  unemployment	  as	  a	  control	  variable,	  which	  is	  measured	  in	  percentages.	  The	  variable	  of	  UNEMPLOYMENT	  enables	  us	  to	  control	  for	  variations	  in	  the	  working	  age	  population	  who	  would	  be	  eligible	  for	  social	  transfers	  (Lupu	  and	  Pontusson	  2011).	  	  I	  expect	  countries	  that	  have	  more	  unemployment	  to	  have	  higher	  levels	  of	  inequality.	  	  GDP	  GROWTH	  is	  also	  measured	  in	  percentages,	  which	  can	  also	  assume	  a	  negative	  value	  for	  some	  cases.	  26	  Annual	  growth	  is	  especially	  known	  to	  be	  a	  positive	  indicator	  for	  social	  spending,	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  translate	  to	  redistributive	  outcomes	  (Lupu	  and	  Pontusson	  2011).	  GDP	  per	  capita	  has	  also	  been	  used	  a	  determinant	  of	  income	  inequality,	  with	  varying	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Data	  taken	  from	  Klaus	  Armingeon,	  David	  Weisstanner,	  Sarah	  Engler,	  Panajotis	  Potolidis,	  Marlène	  Gerber,	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  Leimgruber.	  Comparative	  Political	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  Set	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  1960-­‐2009,	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effects	  in	  less	  developed	  and	  OECD	  countries	  (Reuveny	  and	  Li	  2003).	  Another	  control	  variable,	  EMPLOYMENT	  INDUSTRY,	  measures	  the	  percentage	  of	  people	  employed	  in	  the	  industry,	  shown	  to	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  overall	  inequality	  (Gustafsson	  and	  Johanson	  1999).	  	   A	  well-­‐established	  finding	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  that	  democracy	  is	  negatively	  related	  with	  inequality.	  In	  fact,	  democracy	  offers	  more	  opportunities	  for	  participation,	  thereby	  allowing	  the	  poor	  to	  demand	  more	  equitable	  redistribution.	  Since	  democratic	  leaders	  must	  care	  about	  reelection,	  they	  tend	  to	  adopt	  redistributive	  policies	  that	  favor	  the	  lower	  classes,	  such	  as	  welfare	  spending	  or	  minimum	  wage	  laws	  (Chan	  1997,	  Reuveny	  and	  Li	  2003).	  Although	  most	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  the	  database	  are	  democracies	  during	  the	  period	  under	  analysis,	  I	  include	  the	  DEMOCRACY	  as	  a	  control	  variable,	  which	  is	  operationalized	  by	  the	  Polity	  IV	  score,	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  whether	  varying	  degrees	  of	  democracy	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  economic	  redistribution.	  I	  also	  include	  variables	  which	  are,	  on	  general,	  expected	  to	  be	  higher	  in	  welfare	  states	  and	  highly	  centralized	  states,	  such	  as	  public	  spending,	  social	  security	  transfers	  or	  net	  union	  membership.	  The	  measures	  of	  net	  union	  membership,	  social	  security	  transfers	  and	  total	  social	  expenditure	  aim	  to	  control	  for	  factors	  that	  are	  used	  frequently	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  links	  welfare	  states	  and	  income	  inequality	  (Rueda	  2008,	  Moene	  and	  Wallerstein	  2003).	  As	  stated	  earlier,	  centralized	  wage	  bargaining	  and	  strong	  union	  membership	  should	  be	  expected	  to	  counterbalance	  the	  effect	  of	  market	  forces,	  which	  increase	  inequality	  (Kenworthy	  and	  Pontusson	  2005,	  Glaeser	  2006).	  The	  NET	  UNION	  MEMBERSHIP	  variable	  measures	  net	  union	  membership,	  (gross	  minus	  independent	  workers,	  students,	  unemployed	  or	  retired	  members),	  which	  is	  expected	  to	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  income	  inequality	  (Cusack,	  Iversen	  and	  Rehm	  2009).	  SOCIAL	  EXPENDITURE,	  as	  a	  characteristic	  of	  welfare	  states,	  measures	  the	  total	  public	  and	  mandatory	  private	  social	  expenditure	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  (Esping-­‐Andersen	  1990).	  The	  variable	  of	  SOCIAL	  SECURITY	  TRANSFERS	  measures	  these	  transfers	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  and	  includes	  social	  assistance	  grants	  and	  welfare	  benefits	  paid	  by	  general	  government,	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like	  benefits	  for	  sickness,	  old-­‐age,	  family	  allowances,	  etc.27	  Among	  advanced	  democracies,	  government	  redistribution	  through	  taxes	  and	  transfers	  is	  argued	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  less	  income	  inequality,	  especially	  before	  transfers	  (Lupu	  and	  Pontusson	  2011).	  The	  last	  control	  variable	  I	  include	  is	  WAGE	  COORDINATION28	  which	  aims	  to	  capture	  the	  cross-­‐national	  differences	  of	  the	  levels	  at	  which	  wage	  agreements	  are	  negotiated,	  which	  looks	  at	  how	  Model	  5	  also	  includes	  another	  control	  variable	  WAGE	  COORDINATION.	  Wage	  coordination	  measures	  ‘the	  degree	  of	  intentional	  harmonization	  in	  the	  wage	  setting	  process	  –	  wages	  and	  salaries	  -­‐	  ’	  and	  how	  centralized	  the	  peak	  bargaining	  process	  is	  (Wallerstein	  1999).	  Countries	  that	  rank	  higher	  on	  wage	  coordination	  would	  have	  a	  more	  centralized	  process	  of	  the	  determination	  of	  wages	  and	  salaries,	  and	  thus	  I	  expect	  higher	  wage	  coordination	  to	  lead	  to	  less	  income	  inequality.	  	  	  	  
Appendix	  2:	  Countries	  Included	  in	  the	  Dataset	  1. Austria	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2. Belgium	  	  3. Denmark	  4. Finland	  5. France	  6. Germany	  7. Greece	  8. Ireland	  9. Italy	  10. Luxembourg	  11. Netherlands	  12. Norway	  13. Portugal	  14. Spain	  15. Sweden	  16. Switzerland	  	  17. United	  Kingdom	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Data	  taken	  from	  Comparative	  Political	  Data	  Set	  I.	  28	  Data	  taken	  from	  Kenworthy	  (2001).	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Appendix	  3	  
	  Summary	  Statistics	  	  Variable	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  Net	  income	  inequality	  (scale	  of	  0	  to	  100)	   27.80114	   4.186748	   19.7	   39.1091	  Regional	  authority	  (aggregate	  score)	   10.98601	   8.756616	   0	   32.1	  Fiscal	  autonomy	  (scale	  of	  0	  to	  5)	   1.547167	   1.511185	   0	   4.9	  Fiscal	  control	  (scale	  of	  0	  to	  3)	   .5374384	   .8350535	   0	   3	  Democracy	  (scale	  of	  -­‐10	  to	  10)	   8.971631	   3.722842	   -­‐9	   10	  GDP	  per	  capita	  (in	  $)	   14471.62	   11611.04	   716.18	   81428.24	  GDP	  growth	  (in	  %)	   3.432898	   2.627138	   -­‐7.3	   13.	  
Unemployment	  (in	  %)	   5.329254	   4.261337	   .002472	  24.1714	   5.329254	  Employment	  industry	  (in	  K)	   2802.596	   3472.426	   23.6	   15068	  Social	  expenditures	  (%	  of	  GDP)	   22.60482	   4.909158	   10.15	   36.178	  Wage	  coordination	  (1-­‐	  5)	   3.675	   1.254	   1	   5	  Net	  union	  membership	  	  (total,	  in	  K)	   2407.992	   2625.728	   52.4	   11969.4	  Social	  security	  transfers	  (%	  of	  GDP)	   13.6724	   4.531272	   2.3	   28.9093	  	  	  	  
